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QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY 
1 OVERVIEW
The expansion in global activity has continued in the final stretch of 2018, although some 
signs of slowing have become evident. Moreover, the behaviour from region to region has 
become more heterogeneous than at the start of the year. This is reflecting the partial 
materialisation of some of the uncertainties that have been assailing the global economy 
since the beginning of the year, in particular trade tensions and some tightening of global 
financial conditions. The upshot has been several episodes of volatility on financial 
markets, resulting in falls in share prices and rises in corporate spreads. 
Looking ahead, a potential worsening of the repercussions of these two sources of 
uncertainty cannot be ruled out. And additional, Europe-centred uncertainties, such as the 
future of Italy’s budgetary policy and the ultimate shape of the United Kingdom’s exit from 
the European Union, should be kept in mind. Furthermore, more recently concerns have 
arisen over the course of the Chinese economy, where growing signs of weakening activity 
have emerged, despite the stimulus provided by demand-side policies. Against a 
background in which agents’ debt has increased very swiftly in recent years, there is a fear 
that a hypothetical deepening of the deceleration in the Chinese economy may adversely 
affect the stability of its financial system. In this setting, it is unclear to what extent the 
authorities may be able to reverse the slowdown by implementing a fresh round of 
monetary and fiscal stimuli. 
In the euro area, the second half of the year saw the extension of the more moderate 
growth phase evident since early 2018. These developments are partly due to a successive 
combination of different, transitory factors. The latest such factor has been the impact on 
the car industry of a new regulation on vehicle emission pollutants. However, there appear 
to be ever-greater signs of a more persistent component, linked to the weakening of the 
euro area’s external setting, that would account for this phase of more contained growth. 
Along these lines is the loss of momentum in exports targeted on the rest of the world. 
These developments have been reflected in the latest Eurosystem projections, which have 
revised expected GDP growth in 2018 and 2019 downwards by 0.1 percentage points 
(pp). In order to ensure that inflation converges on its medium-term objective, the December 
ECB Governing Council decided that, following the discontinuation of net asset purchases 
at the end of the year, it will reinvest the principal payments of maturing assets acquired 
under the programme for an extended period of time following the start of interest rate 
rises.
The Spanish economy is, on the information available to date, expected to have grown at 
a quarter-on-quarter rate of 0.6% in 2018 Q4, unchanged on the two previous quarters 
(see Chart 1 and Table 1). The slowdown in activity in Spain during 2018 is estimated to 
have been notably less acute than in the euro area as a whole, a development partly due 
to the inclusion in the State Budget for 2018, which came into force in the summer, of 
certain measures boosting household income. Moreover, the introduction of the new 
regulation on vehicle emission pollutants would appear to have exerted a comparatively 
less marked effect on activity in the car industry in Spain than in other euro area economies, 
such as Germany.
In terms of components, the buoyancy of output in the recent period has been underpinned 
by the expansionary course of domestic demand. In particular, household consumption has 
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continued to be supported by the strength of employment generation and also by the 
expansionary effect on household income of the aforementioned fiscal measures and, more 
recently, the fall in oil prices. Turning to foreign trade flows in goods and services, the as yet 
substantially incomplete information available for the closing months of the year tentatively 
suggests some improvement in exports of both goods and tourist services, following their 
notable weakness during the year. The loss of momentum in the external sector of the 
Spanish economy in recent quarters would be due to a confluence of several explanatory 
factors, among which the loss of strength in the demand from the rest of the world has been 
fundamental. The lagged effects of the appreciation of the euro in 2017 and, in the domain 
of tourist services, the recovery by competing Mediterranean destinations that had been 
affected In previous years by heightened security concerns were also contributing factors. 
In the medium term, the Banco de España foresees a continuation of the expansion in 
activity, assisted by the correction of the economy’s imbalances and by the still-
expansionary effects of the monetary policy measures adopted in the past. Nonetheless, 
these stimuli will tend to have a diminishing impact over the course of the projection period 
(running to 2021), which will mean, among other reasons, that GDP growth will tend to 
ease. Specifically, after increasing by 2.5% in 2018, GDP will post respective rates of 
2.2%, 1.9% and 1.7% in the three following years.1
As regards consumer prices, the core component has continued to hold relatively stable in 
recent months and is expected to begin to rise as capacity utilisation intensifies in step with 
the continuation of the upturn. The announced increase in the minimum wage is not, on its 
own, expected to exert a significant upward effect on inflation, since in terms of unit labour 
costs it is estimated that the rise in average wage growth will be offset by a similar rise in 
productivity, given the impact that the measure would have in terms of job destruction. 
The baseline scenario for activity in the Spanish economy would not be immune to a 
hypothetical materialisation of any of the above-mentioned shocks stemming from the 
1  Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2018-2021): the Banco de España’s contribution to the 
Eurosystem’s December 2018 joint forecasting exercise.
SOURCES: Eurostat, INE and Banco de España.
a Quarter-on-quarter rates of change based on seasonally adjusted series, in the case of GDP, and year-on-year rates of change on original series, in consumer 
price indices.
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external setting. However, economic policies can make a significant contribution to 
reducing the degree of vulnerability. In particular, the design of a well-defined strategy to 
durably reduce the structural budget deficit and general government debt would help 
create some room for manoeuvre so that fiscal policy may address the consequences of 
any future slowdown in activity and contribute to limiting any potential rise in borrowing 
costs for public and private agents.
Further, launching a raft of reforms to promote the more efficient functioning of the markets 
for labour and for goods and services would also help raise the economy’s potential 
growth and its resilience in the face of external shocks. In this respect, maintaining and 
strengthening the main elements of the current labour market legal framework in such a 
way as to help ensure that adjustment in this market is compatible with less job destruction 
during recessions would prove timely, as would the lifting of the regulations restricting 
competition in some product markets. 
In this respect, it should be recalled that the costs associated with the introduction of all 
these measures are lower when they are adopted in times of economic buoyancy such as 
the present.
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Banco de España contribution to the December 2018 joint Eurosystem projections exercise.
b Contribution to the quarter-on-quarter rate of change of GDP (pp).
c The 2018 Q4 figure is the average of the October and November year-on-year rates. The November 2018 figure was published after the cut-off date for these 
projections.
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The current economic expansion in the USA is on the verge of 
becoming the longest on record.1 Specifically, the duration of this 
period of sustained growth, largely underpinned by the expansionary 
stance of economic policies, is now nine years.2 However, the high 
recent GDP growth (with annualised quarter-on-quarter rates above 
3.5% in the middle two quarters of 2018), which has taken the output 
gap into positive territory (see Chart 1) and reduced the unemployment 
rate to 3.7% of the labour force (its lowest level for the last 50 years), 
has given rise to a less balanced composition of aggregate demand, 
with a higher weight of consumption and a certain fall-off in 
investment, perhaps signalling a certain exhaustion of the cycle. 
Looking forward, it is expected that the more restrictive stance to be 
adopted by demand-side policies will contribute to raising the 
likelihood of a change of cycle in the US economy. This box analyses 
the foreseeable behaviour of fiscal and monetary policy and their 
effect on expected US growth in the next few years.
In the monetary arena, against a background of gradually rising 
inflation (see Chart 2) and progressive improvement in the labour 
market, the Federal Reserve has raised its policy rate by 200 bp 
since December 2015 (see Chart 3) and may further raise it by 
another 125 bp up to the end of 2020, according to the median of 
the projections of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
members. Furthermore, in October 2017, the Federal Reserve 
began to downsize its balance sheet, and is expected to continue 
to do so gradually over the coming years. Although the Federal 
Reserve expects inflation to remain around the target of 2% in the 
near future, the scant slack in the labour market and the effects of 
the tariff increases pose upside risks to the baseline price scenario, 
the materialisation of which would prompt additional tightening of 
monetary policy and further toughening of domestic and global 
financial conditions.3
BOX 1 THE US ECONOMY: CYCLICAL POSITION AND ROLE OF DEMAND-SIDE POLICIES
1  See the business cycle dating published by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research since the middle of the 19th century.
2  The average duration of expansions in the USA since 1945 is 
approximately five years.
FUENTES: Bloomberg, 
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Congressional Budget Office, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Federal Reserve and Bloomberg.
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
GDP OUTPUT GAP CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE PROJECTIONS
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
CONSUMPTION DEFLATOR (GENERAL) CONSUMPTION DEFLATOR (CORE)
INFLATION (CPI) CORE INFLATION
TARGET FOMC PROJECTIONS
0
1
2
3
4
5
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
5,000
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
FEDERAL RESERVE ASSETS BALANCE SHEET DOWNSIZING PROJECTIONS
POLICY RATE (right-hand scale) POLICY RATE PROJECTIONS
DOLLAR NOMINAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE (NEER) (right-hand scale)
3  MONETARY POLICY
$bn %
67
70
73
76
79
82
85
88
91
94
97
100
-4.0
-3.5
-3.0
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
FISCAL STIMULUS
CYCLICALLY-ADJUSTED PRIMARY DEFICIT
GOVERNMENT DEBT HELD BY THE PUBLIC (right-hand scale)
4  FISCAL STIMULUS AND PUBLIC DEBT
% of GDP % of GDPProjection
1  GDP AND OUTPUT GAP
% y-o-y
2  CPI, PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE (PCE) PRICE INDEX  
    AND TARGET INFLATION
% y-o-y
Chart 1
CYCLICAL POSITION AND ROLE OF DEMAND POLICIES
3  Specifically, it is estimated that a tightening in financial conditions of 1 
standard deviation may clip as much as 1.6 pp from the annual growth of 
the USA, See Hatzius, J. and S. Stehn (2018), “The case for a financial 
conditions index”, Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper.
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As regards fiscal policy, it is estimated that the stimulus derived 
from the expansionary measures adopted in late 2017 and early 
2018 will have a positive impact on GDP growth of 0.6 pp in both 
2018 and 2019.4 As this fiscal stimulus peters out after 2020 
(see Chart 4), activity will tend to slow, falling back towards its 
trend growth rate in the medium term, slightly below 2%, 
according to the projections of the Congressional Budget Office.
Lastly, it should be noted that the protectionist about-face of the 
current US administration will continue to be another key factor in 
the US economic outlook. The imposition of trade tariffs is a 
prerogative of the president and it is unlikely that the outcome of 
the mid-term elections will alter the protectionist trade policy 
agenda. If the threats made were to be carried out, the trade 
conflict could trim nearly 0.5 pp from US GDP growth in 2019, 
according to estimates by the main international organisations.5
In short, the loss of support for expansionary demand-side policies 
against a background of high uncertainty due to trade tensions, 
points to a slowdown in US economic activity in the coming years to 
growth rates more in line with potential. Moreover, in the event of a 
hypothetical recession in the medium term, the room for manoeuvre 
of demand-side policies is now more constrained than in previous 
recessions. Firstly, monetary policy faces a setting of lower natural 
interest rates and a higher likelihood of hitting the policy rate floor. 
Secondly, the action of automatic stabilisers and the application of a 
discretionary expansionary fiscal policy would be partially limited by 
the severe fiscal imbalances built up in recent years.
BOX 1
 
THE US ECONOMY: CYCLICAL POSITION AND ROLE OF DEMAND-SIDE POLICIES (cont’d)
4  An Update to the Economic Outlook: 2018 to 2028.
5  See for example, IMF (2018), World Economic Outlook, October 2018; 
and OECD (2018), Economic Outlook, November 2018.
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The financial strains recently experienced by some emerging market 
economies (EMEs) reflect growing global interdependence, which has 
accentuated these countries’ exposure to international economic and 
financial events. Specifically, in the past year, EMEs have been shaken 
by the effects of the trade tensions between China and the United 
States, and to those arising from the US fiscal and monetary policy 
mix, which have prompted an appreciation of the dollar and a 
tightening of international financial conditions.1
However, the deterioration in the EMEs’ financial indicators has 
not been uniform; rather, investors have taken the degree of 
vulnerability of the different countries into account in their portfolio 
decisions, as was the case in previous bouts of turbulence linked 
to changes in US financial conditions, the so-called “taper 
tantrum” from May to August 2013 being a case in point. 
Specifically, in the episode from April to September 2018, the 
financial tensions particularly affected those economies with 
sizeable vulnerabilities, in particular in terms of a weak external 
position (see Charts 1 and 2). The two countries that most suffered 
in this phase of instability were Argentina and Turkey, which have 
already been the subject of recent detailed analysis.2
This box assesses the current degree of vulnerability in EMEs as a 
whole, before focusing on the most relevant countries, either in 
terms of their weight in global activity and their systemic relevance 
(as is the case of China), or because of their importance to the 
Spanish economy (Brazil and Mexico).3
The indicators habitually used to examine the emerging economies’ 
vulnerabilities include some relating to their external position 
(current account balance, external debt and international reserves), 
their fiscal stance (budget deficit and public debt), their 
macroeconomic situation (GDP growth and inflation), the 
soundness of their banking systems (credit growth, traditional 
funding via deposits versus external financing) and political risks.4 
In aggregate terms, when considering this set of indicators the 
diagnosis about whether the degree of vulnerability is higher or 
lower currently compared with the aforementioned episode in 
2013 is not clear, since some of these indicators have improved, 
but others have worsened (see Chart 3). In particular, inflation has 
fallen compared with five years earlier (from 5% to 3.8%), growth 
rates have remained high (slightly over 5% in both cases) and the 
situation of the banking sector is sounder (their banks’ net external 
assets have risen from 0.5% to 2% of GDP). Conversely, the fiscal 
margin has now diminished (the average deficit has dipped from 
2.1% of GDP in 2013 to 3.5% in 2018 Q1), public debt and external 
debt ratios have risen, international reserves have fallen and the 
geostrategic risk indicators and domestic political tensions are 
greater than they were in 2013.5 . Furthermore, from a shorter time 
perspective, the emerging economies’ vulnerability has increased 
in the external and fiscal arena since early 2017. 
As to the three individual economies considered, the main risks in the 
case of Brazil are in the fiscal domain, since the budget deficit has been 
standing above 7% of GDP for three years and public debt has climbed 
to 77.2% of GDP, a historical high (see Chart 4). Against this background, 
it is essential to curb the expected high growth of Social Security 
spending, through the reform of the pension system, which has been 
pending for over a year.6 Further, there are several factors of vulnerability 
in some financial institutions, including banks and investment funds, 
which have absorbed a very high proportion of new government debt 
issues, and in public-sector banks, owing to the segmentation of credit 
markets (in which almost half of total loans have been granted at 
subsidised interest rates by public banks, as opposed to the rest, 
granted at higher rates – and with bigger margins – by private banks, 
which are concentrated in segments such as consumer credit). These 
factors have given rise to a deterioration in the sector’s valuation by 
analysts and investors. However, other indicators have tended to 
improve recently. The usual indicators of political uncertainty, which 
had risen owing to the uncertainty surrounding the presidential vote, 
have abated following these elections. Moreover, Brazil has managed 
to adjust its current account deficit in recent years (from 4.4% of GDP 
in early 2015 to 0.5% in 2018, Chart 4), meaning external debt has 
fallen slightly. Inflation, meanwhile, has been substantially cut from 
10.8% on average in 2015 to 4.5% in September 2018. Finally, reserves 
stand at historical highs ($338 billion), with very limited exposure by the 
public sector to the external sector. 
The fiscal position is also a factor of vulnerability in Mexico, 
although the imbalances are far lower than in Brazil: the budget 
deficit has held at between 2.5% and 3% of GDP since 2010, 
while public debt increased by more than 10 pp from 2010 to 
2016, stabilising thereafter at around 45% of GDP (see Chart 5). 
On the contrary, the current account imbalance and external debt 
BOX 2VULNERABILITIES IN THE EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES
1  Box 2 (“Recent turbulence in emerging markets”) of the “Quarterly Report 
on the Spanish Economy”, Economic Bulletin 3/18, Banco de España, 
describes the tensions experienced this year by these economies. 
2  See the reference in footnote 1.
3  See Molina L., E. Alberola and E. López (2016), “El posicionamiento 
exterior de la economía española”, Documentos Ocasionales, No 1602, 
Banco de España, in which a hierarchy is established of the significance 
of various economies to Spain, based on goods export figures, tourism 
revenues, non-tourist services exports and direct investment assets.
4  The identification of these variables is based on various models of 
foreign exchange and banking crises: Krugman, P. (1979), “A model of 
Balance of Payments crises”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
Vol.11; Obstfeld, M. (1986), “Rational and Self-fulfilling Balance-of-
Payments Crises”, American Economic Review, Vol. 76(1); Eichengreen, 
B. and R. Hausmann (1999), Exchange Rates and Financial Fragility, 
NBER WP 7418.
5  In some of these indicators, the deterioration observed is due to the 
Chinese economy. Specifically, if China is excluded, an increase in 
international reserves and a reduction in the current account deficit of 
almost 0.6 pp of GDP can both be seen. 
6  For further details see Banco de España (2016), “Report on the Latin 
American economy. Second half of 2016”, Economic Bulletin, October 
2016.
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BOX 2
 
VULNERABILITIES IN THE EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES (cont’d)
SOURCES: Banco de España, Datastream, IIF and JP Morgan.
a Argentina, Brazil, Turkey, Tunisia and Nigeria.
b India, Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa and Turkey.
c Standardised series with average and standard deviation from 2008. Outward movement by the variables entails greater vulnerability.
d The dotted line depicts reserves as a percentage of GDP were Mexico to receive the $88 bn of the FCL entered into with the IMF.
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BOX 2 VULNERABILITIES IN THE EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES (cont’d)
have been adjusted in the past two years and international 
reserves, despite having fallen, hold above their historical average. 
Moreover, in this latter area, Mexico has a Flexible Credit Line 
(FCL) with the IMF worth $88 billion, half its current reserves. 
In the case of China, the main vulnerabilities stem from the trade 
tensions with the United States and, from a more structural 
perspective, from the ongoing re-balancing of the Chinese economy 
towards a growth model based more on the services sector and 
private consumption, and less on investment and exports, with very 
high rates of corporate debt. In the transition from one model to the 
other, the Chinese authorities face the dilemma, in the current 
context of less favourable external conditions, of choosing between 
maintaining the pace of the process of transformation, on one hand, 
and supporting economic growth, on the other, even though this 
may check the correction of its macrofinancial imbalances. Against 
this backdrop, the corporate debt ratio exceeded 150% of GDP in 
2017; that said, the proportion accounted for by shadow banking in 
this figure has declined at the expense of bank lending, which has 
grown at a real rate of 9% in the past two years.7
The financial vulnerabilities of the Chinese economy are also 
significant. Firstly, banks increasingly resort to the markets for 
financing (the issuance of certificates of deposits in 2017 and 
2018 doubled) which, together with the slowdown in deposits, has 
raised the loan/deposits ratio to close to unity. Secondly, a strong 
increase in Chinese banks’ and real estate development 
companies’ bond issues on international markets was observed 
throughout 2017, which might entail certain risks when these 
sectors have to face their external debt maturities, most of which 
are concentrated in the next three years (see Chart 6). 
Notwithstanding, China continues to hold a high volume of 
international reserves ($3.1 trillion) and its levels of external and 
public debt are low, which affords it substantial room for 
manoeuvre.
In short, analysis of the vulnerabilities of the main emerging 
economies points to an increase in fiscal imbalances in the cases 
of Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Mexico, and to high corporate 
sector debt in China. Nonetheless, the high volumes of reserves in 
China and Brazil (along with Mexico’s contingent borrowing 
arrangement with the IMF) and the healthy external position of 
these economies are factors that offer a degree of protection to 
mitigate the effect of the potential risks that might arise in a setting 
of tighter global financing conditions and uncertainty over 
international trade developments. 
7  See, in this connection, Box 3 (“Some implications of the announced 
expansionary stance of China’s macroeconomic policies”), “Quarterly 
Report on the Spanish Economy”, Economic Bulletin 3/2018, Banco de 
España.
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During the past decade, euro area fiscal policy has been marked 
by the ongoing reduction in the budget deficit from the peak of 
6.2% of GDP in 2009 to the forecast figure of 0.6% for 2018. The 
correction of the budgetary imbalance was the outcome, first, of a 
package of discretionary structural measures involving expenditure 
cuts and tax increases; and further, of the effects of the pick-up in 
activity and of the reduction in interest rates. This ultimately 
prompted a decrease in the public debt ratio from 94% of GDP in 
2014 to below 87% of GDP in 2018. 
The budgetary plans for 2019 submitted by the euro area countries 
to the European Commission suggest a change in tack in the 
area’s fiscal policy towards a slightly expansionary stance, i.e. one 
conducive to demand growth. The deficit is thus expected in 2019 
to post its first increase in the past decade as a percentage of 
GDP (0.2 pp) to stand at 0.8%.1 That would not prevent a fresh cut 
in debt, to 85.1% of GDP, assisted by the economic expansion 
and the pick-up in inflation.2 In structural terms, the increase in the 
deficit will be somewhat greater (0.3 pp), placing it at 1% of 
potential GDP3 (Charts 1 and 2).
While on a very modest scale, this expansionary stance is in notable 
contrast to the recommendation published last July by the European 
Fiscal Council. This body, taking into consideration the robust pace of 
growth of activity in most euro area countries and the still-high levels 
of public debt, advised maintaining a restrictive fiscal policy, especially 
in the countries with high debt levels, that would provide for budgetary 
room for manoeuvre so as to address adverse future situations.4
Country by country, the fiscal policy stance in 2019 is, in most 
cases, expansionary or neutral, in a setting in which positive 
output gaps prevail (Chart 3). On these estimates, there would 
only be five countries (in addition to Greece) for which fiscal 
policy would act in a countercyclical fashion in 2019: France5, 
Austria, Finland, Estonia and Latvia. Among the countries 
projected to have a more lax budgetary policy are some, such as 
Italy and Cyprus, that also have high debt ratios (Chart 4).6 
Conversely, it is worth noting the fiscal expansion planned by 
some countries which, having posted low deficit and debt levels, 
have greater fiscal space, Germany and the Netherlands being 
cases in point. 
Italy is the country planning a more expansionary fiscal stance, 
with an increase in its structural deficit of close to 1% of potential 
GDP (Chart 2). This is in contrast to its commitment under the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) to a 0.6 pp adjustment to its 
deficit.7 This breach, along with that relating to the debt reduction 
criterion, whose ratio, on European Commission November 2018 
forecasts, is expected to stand at 131% of GDP in 2019, has given 
rise to the Commission’s recommendation that an Excessive 
Deficit Procedure based on debt be initiated.8 That has led the 
government to reconsider some of the measures planned.
Given the environment of limited fiscal space currently 
characterising the euro area, the appropriate composition of fiscal 
policy measures is vital as far as the instruments used are 
concerned.9 The fiscal impulse inferred by the aggregation of draft 
budgetary plans for 2019 stems in full from the revenue side, while 
expenditure offers a more neutral aspect.10 The expansionary 
measures affecting the expenditure side include most notably, the 
increase in public investment (following the cut observed in the 
wake of the crisis) and in welfare benefits, especially in Germany 
and Italy11 (see Chart 5). The reduction in tax revenue in 2019 
stems above all from social contributions, which have generally 
fallen across the board, most notably in France.12 In terms of the 
revenue ratio, this has been offset in part by an increase in indirect 
taxation, which chiefly affects France, Spain and the Netherlands 
(see Chart 6). 
BOX 3 FISCAL POLICY OUTLOOK FOR THE EURO AREA IN 2019
1  The aggregate budgetary magnitudes for the area as a whole mask 
substantial heterogeneity from country to country. Eleven members 
project a surplus or balanced budget for 2019, while of the eight 
countries forecasting a deficit for the coming year, only France and Italy 
foresee an increase on 2018. It is indeed these two countries that project 
the highest deficits, although neither exceeds the reference value of 3% 
of GDP.
2  In its November projections, the European Commission coincides with 
the draft budgetary plans as regards the deficits forecast for 2018 and 
2019; for debt, meanwhile, it envisages a somewhat greater reduction in 
2018 and a slightly lower one in 2019, when debt is expected to stand at 
84.9% of GDP. 
3  Estimated by the European Commission, using the common 
methodology for the calculation of potential GDP, based on budgetary 
planning data. For the area as a whole it coincides practically with that 
published in November 2018 by the European Commission on the basis 
of its own forecasts. However, according to these forecasts, if Italy is 
excluded the euro area’s fiscal policy stance in 2019 will be practically 
neutral, with an increase in the structural deficit of 0.1 pp of potential 
GDP. 
4  European Fiscal Board (2019). Assessment of the prospective fiscal 
stance appropriate for the euro area in 2019.
5  France’s budgetary plan does not include the government’s recently 
announced expenditure-increasing measures.
 6  The budgetary plans of 10 countries contain debt ratios that exceed the 
60%-of-GDP threshold. Among these, two (Greece and Italy) exceed 
120%, with the Portuguese debt ratio just below the threshold in 2019, 
and with another four members (Belgium, France, Spain and Cyprus) 
with ratios close to 100%.
 7  Specifically, Italy projects an increase of 0.9 pp in its structural deficit, 
to 2.6% of potential GDP. The European Commission estimates an 
even higher structural deficit for Italy, rising from 1.8% of potential GDP 
in 2018, to 3% in 2019. 
 8  The Council should decide within four months whether it approves this 
Procedure, following the opinion of the Economic and Financial 
Committee and the subsequent submission to the Council and the 
European Parliament of a new report by the Commission with the 
details of the adjustment programme. 
 9  See Chapter 4 of the Banco de España Annual Report 2016.
10  The cyclically adjusted expenditure ratio holds at 47.1% of potential 
GDP, while the cyclically adjusted revenue ratio falls by 0.4 pp to 45.8% 
of potential GDP.
11  In Italy’s case, the bringing forward of the minimum retirement age and 
the introduction of the “Citizen’s Income” account for 0.7 pp of GDP.
12  The conversion of the tax credit for competitiveness and employment 
(CICE by its French acronym) into a permanent reduction in payroll 
charges accounts for approximately 0.8 pp of French GDP.
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BOX 3 FISCAL POLICY OUTLOOK FOR THE EURO AREA IN 2019 (cont’d)
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Regulation (EU) 2017/1151 came into force across the EU on 1 
September 2018. Under this regulation, the application of a new 
protocol for the measurement of automobile pollutant emissions 
known as the Worldwide Harmonised Light-Duty Vehicles Test 
Procedure (WLTP) is mandatory. All vehicle registrations 
performed after that date must comply with this protocol. In 
practice, this means that measurements of fuel consumption 
and emissions are more stringent than those obtained under the 
previous system. This regulatory change has immediate tax 
effects, since vehicle registration tax is calculated based on 
CO2 emissions,1 and it also obliges manufacturers to adapt their 
production systems to ensure that vehicles comply with the new 
legal requirements.
The two measurement systems will coexist until 31 December 
2020. The European regulations provide a tool that permits 
correlating the values of CO2 emissions of the WLTP with those of 
the New European Driving Cycle (NEDC) for the purpose of having 
a comparable base. The Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism 
has approved the use of this transitional system2 to reduce the 
impact on the automotive industry. This measure does not exempt 
any vehicle from complying with the emissions established in the 
new standards, but rather intends to graduate the tax impact of 
the change in procedure and facilitate manufacturers’ 
implementation of the technologies and developments required to 
adapt their range of products to the new cycle requirements.
This regulatory change is giving rise to several consequences for the 
automotive industry. During the summer car dealers tried to dispose 
of the stocks of vehicles that would not meet the new standards,3 
offering heavy discounts. They also resorted to self-registration for 
their final sale at a later date, since the new regulations will not be 
applied to second-hand cars. The main effect, however, derives from 
the need for manufacturers to change their production so that the 
new models comply with the regulatory change. The volume of 
economic activity that is directly affected by this legislative change is 
significant, given the weight of the automotive industry4 in the euro 
area (see Charts 1 and 2), accounting for somewhat more than 20% 
of Germany’s manufacturing production (around 7% of the 
economy’s total output) and increasing since 2009, and for 8% in 
France and 7% in Italy. These figures are relatively large in Spain, 
albeit lower than in Germany, accounting for 11% of total 
manufacturing output (around 3% of total output). In employment 
terms, the weight of the automotive industry as a percentage of total 
manufacturing in Germany, France, Italy and Spain is 12%, 4.1%, 
4.4% and 7.5%, respectively (approximately 2%, 0.4%, 0.7% and 
0.8%, respectively, in the total economy.
Additionally, this sector is very important for the export activity of 
euro area countries. In Spain, motor vehicle exports accounted for 
around 11% of the total in 2017 in nominal terms, although the 
sector’s relative weight in the total has been decreasing in recent 
years, given the degree of external openness of the rest of the 
economy seen since the crisis.5 In Germany the weight of the 
BOX 4IMPACT OF THE NEW EMISSIONS REGULATION ON THE AUTOMOBILE MARKET
SOURCE: Eurostat.
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1  Vehicle registration tax in Spain is divided into brackets, based on vehicles’ 
emission levels. Those with emissions lower than 120 gr/km are exempt 
from paying the tax. The tax rate for those with emissions between 121 gr/
km and 160 gr/km is 4.75% and for those between 161 gr/km and 200 gr/
km it is 9.75%. Cars with emissions in excess of 200 gr/km are taxed at 
14.75%. The fact that the new legislation addresses higher emission levels 
means that certain vehicles will no longer be tax exempt and others will 
move to a higher bracket.
2  See press release  https://www.mincotur.gob.es/es-es/GabinetePrensa/
NotasPrensa/2018/Paginas/20180831.aspx
3  Car dealers may continue to register vehicles certified under the NEDC 
protocol until 1 September 2019, provided the volume does not exceed 
10% of the previous year’s total sales.
4  Unless expressly stated otherwise, the automotive industry refers to 
sector 29 of the Spanish National Classification of Economic Activities 
(CNAE, by its Spanish abbreviation): Manufacture of motor vehicles, 
trailers and semi-trailers.
5  See M. Almunia, P. Antràs, D. López-Rodríguez and E. Morales (2018) 
Venting Out: Exports during a Domestic Slump, Banco de España 
Working Paper No. 1844.
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automotive sector in exports is also 11%, while in France and Italy 
it is lower, accounting for 4.7% and 4.4%, respectively.
Nonetheless, the sector is more important for foreign trade than 
what these figures reflect. The automobile production process 
involves successive interactions between different firms that are 
located in different countries so that it is not possible to be 
immediately aware of the position and participation of each 
economy in the global supply chains. The world input-output 
database (WIOD) allows breaking down exports into the fraction 
relating to foreign value added (imported content) and domestic 
value added, i.e. the respective contributions of non-resident and 
local production factors to total value added, separating from the 
latter a third component, which is domestic value added that is 
re-exported in the form of intermediate goods.6 Chart 3 shows 
how, in comparison with the other large countries of the euro area, 
Spain has a greater weight of the so-called “backward” component 
(inputs from abroad) and a lower weight of the “forward” 
component (intermediate inputs that will be re-exported to a third 
country), although the differences are very small in the latter case. 
This composition indicates that the automotive industry in Spain is 
more oriented towards the final product, which could lead to the 
negative impact of regulatory changes on production in the sector 
materialising with some delay in comparison with the other 
countries considered, whose automotive industry focuses more 
on the initial phases of production.
As regards the effect of the regulatory change on the most recent 
activity data, a distinction should be made between demand and 
supply elements. In the case of demand, vehicle registration 
figures were significantly affected in the most recent phase both 
in Spain and in the other European countries where the new 
legislation has been implemented. Thus, very high growth was 
recorded in the months prior to the change in regulation, 
particularly in August (with the exception of Italy, where the rise 
was more moderate), linked in part to the self-registration policy 
discussed previously. In Spain, registrations in August grew 
close to 50% year-on-year, compared with increases of between 
15% and 25% in the same month during the four previous years, 
a pattern that was also seen in Germany and France. Once the 
regulation came into force, these increases were followed by falls 
of varying intensity which offset in some cases the increases of 
August. In the case of Spain, despite the declines in September 
and October, the cumulative growth of registrations during the 
period August-October stood at 5.9%, while falls of 11.3% and 
5.6% were recorded in Italy and Germany, respectively (see 
Chart 4).
As regards supply, car production figures also appear to have 
become distorted around the dates of entry into force of the 
regulation (see Chart 5). In Spain the auto component of the 
Industrial Production Index (IPI) fell by approximately 20% in 
September, partly owing to demand having been brought forward 
to the summer months, but also because the need to certify 
vehicles under the new regulation could have prompted delays in 
the supply chains of the different production plants, according to 
the anecdotal evidence available. The decline in October was 
much more moderate (-1.9%), such that in cumulative terms, car 
production in the period August-October fell by 5.4% vis-à-vis the 
decrease of 2% recorded in the same period in 2017. As regards 
the rest of the European countries analysed, the situation is mixed. 
A significant decline was observed in the period August-October 
in Germany (-11.9%, compared with a 2.4% increase in 2017), 
which was slightly more moderate in Italy (-8.7%, compared with 
a 4.5% increase in 2017) and the effect was minor in France, 
increasing by 0.7% (12.9% in the same period in 2017).
BOX 4 IMPACT OF THE NEW EMISSIONS REGULATION ON THE AUTOMOBILE MARKET (cont’d)
SOURCES: WIOD 2016 and Banco de España calculations.
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6  For further details see E. Prades and P. Villanueva (2017), “Spain in the 
Global Value Chains”, Economic Bulletin, 3/2017, Banco de España, and 
M.P. Timmer et al. (2015), “An illustrated user guide to the World Input-
Output Database: the case of global automotive production”, Review of 
International Economics, vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 575-605.
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BOX 4 IMPACT OF THE NEW EMISSIONS REGULATION ON THE AUTOMOBILE MARKET (cont’d)
SOURCES: European Automobile Manufacturers Association and Eurostat.
a Data relating to sector 291: Manufacture of motor vehicles.
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BOX 4 IMPACT OF THE NEW EMISSIONS REGULATION ON THE AUTOMOBILE MARKET (cont’d)
As regards the outlook for the industry, the indicators available 
reflect a downturn in the months leading to the entry into force of 
the new legislation, which is reversing in subsequent months, an 
effect which appears to be temporary. Specifically, in Spain the 
confidence indicators for the auto industry have shown a downturn 
since May, which worsened in July and August, although this trend 
has reversed. The behaviour of the aggregate indicator is explained 
by the uneven performance of its components. First, in the summer 
months there was a significant accumulation of inventories, 
possibly reflecting the initial problems in demand, which, however, 
declined in later months. As regards the assessment of order 
books, the levels remain high, which seems to point to a temporary 
phenomenon. Finally, the downturn shown in production 
expectations since the summer months also reversed in November, 
pointing to a possible normalisation of activity in production chains 
over the coming months (see Charts 6 to 9).
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One feature that marks out the current upturn favourably is that 
the Spanish economy’s high GDP growth has been compatible 
with maintaining relatively high external surpluses (averaging 2% 
of GDP, in terms of net lending over the period 2013-2017). 
However, more recently, the Spanish economy’s lending capacity 
has decreased somewhat, dropping to 1.4% of GDP in cumulative 
twelve-month terms in September 2018, compared with 2.1% 
over 2017 as a whole (see Chart 1). It is therefore worth analysing 
the factors underlying these developments and, in particular, 
whether they are predominantly transitory or permanent, 
particularly given that, despite the recent correction, the Spanish 
economy still has a high net debtor position against the rest of the 
world. To bring down this debt it will be necessary to run an 
external surplus for an extended period.  This box examines these 
factors and how they affect likely future developments in the 
external balance.
From the viewpoint of the various items of the rest of the world 
account, the recent decrease in the economy’s lending capacity 
has been concentrated in the balance of goods and services. By 
components, the reduction in the surplus in non-energy goods 
and non-tourism services, the widening deficit in energy goods, 
and the falling surplus in tourism services account for around 
65%, 20% and 15% of the total reduction in the external surplus 
since the start of 2017. Unlike the situation observed in the case of 
the goods and services balance, the changes during the period in 
the balance of primary and secondary income and the balance of 
the capital account were insignificant.1
There were a number of factors underlying the deterioration in 
the various components of the balance of goods and services in 
recent quarters. Some of the most significant of these are 
intrinsically transitory, and some, such as the oil price, are 
difficult to predict. In particular, as regards the energy balance, 
the net bill has risen by 0.2 pp of GDP since the start of 2018 
(and 0.5  pp since end-2016), as a consequence of rising oil 
prices, with the price of a barrel climbing from €28 in January 
2016 to €57 in January 2018 and €71 in October 2018 before 
subsequently declining somewhat to €56 in November (see 
Chart 2). The role of dearer oil is also reflected in the breakdown 
of the trade balance by counterparties’ geographical area, with 
the deterioration in the trade balance with countries outside the 
euro area being more pronounced than that with euro area 
countries, given that oil is mainly bought outside the euro area 
(see Chart 3). Nevertheless, the deficit under this heading has 
tended to remain below that observed in previous periods in 
which oil price levels were similar to those today, probably as a 
result of improvements in the Spanish economy’s energy 
efficiency (see Chart 4).2 
For its part, the recent reduction in the balance of non-energy 
goods and non-tourism services was partly a response to losses 
in competitiveness induced by the rise in the value of the euro 
since early 2015 (see Chart 2). On the sales side, the slowdown in 
Spanish export market growth since early 2017 – slowing more 
than growth in global trade flows – has also had a negative impact 
on this sub-balance (see Chart 5).3 Lastly, in the case of tourism, 
the recent deceleration is largely a response to the progressive 
normalisation of the geopolitical situation in competing 
destinations around the Mediterranean, such as Turkey or North 
Africa.4
In the specific case of real terms export flows, a simple econometric 
model proxying how this variable behaves based on its key 
determinants helps quantify the relative importance of each 
determinant in explaining the recent slowdown in this demand 
component. As can be seen in Chart 6, the slowdown in external 
demand and loss of competitiveness5 together account for the 
majority of Spanish exports’ loss of vigour so far in 2018.
Nevertheless, other more persistent factors in the domestic sector 
have also played a significant role in explaining the recent 
moderation of the foreign surplus. In particular, the process of 
substituting certain imported factors with domestic inputs 
observed in recent years6 could have begun to reverse in 2017 
(see Chart  7). This process, in conjunction with an ongoing 
increase in the share of exports, which have a high import content, 
in final demand, would have been reflected in rising elasticity of 
imports to final demand.  In any event, the import content of 
exports and of final demand as a whole remains significantly 
smaller than that observed in the pre-crisis period, such that the 
improvement in the trade balance appears to include a structural 
component (see Chart 8).7
The Banco de España’s latest projections suggest that, as a result 
of the factors just discussed, the economy’s lending capacity 
could decrease in 2018 as a whole to around 1% of GDP.8 Over the 
period from 2019 to 2021, the Spanish economy’s external balance 
BOX 5 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY’S REST OF THE WORLD ACCOUNT
1  Among other items, the primary income balance includes interest 
payments and collections for liabilities and assets vis-à-vis the rest of 
the world. Secondary income includes, among other items, payments 
and collections of migrants’ remittances, and the capital account 
balance includes capital transfers with the rest of the world.
2  See Box 3 of the Banco de España’s September 2018 Quarterly Report.
3  The possible role of adaptation to the new emissions standards for the 
type-approval of new vehicles in the European Union, which came into 
effect on 1 September, is less clear-cut, given that as has happened in 
neighbouring countries, it has affected both sales and foreign purchases.
4  See Box 6 of the Banco de España’s September 2018 Quarterly Report.
5  For more details on the estimation of these contributions, see E. Prades 
and C. García (2015), Actualización de la función de las exportaciones 
españolas de bienes, Economic Bulletin, April, Banco de España
6  See Chapter 3 of the Banco de España’s September 2016 Annual 
Report. In order to distinguish to what extent these developments are 
due to companies importing more inputs from abroad or companies with 
a larger import content have gained market share in 2017 and 2018 a 
company-level granular analysis is needed, for which up-to-date data 
are not available.
7  See Chapter 3 of the Banco de España’s September 2016 Annual 
Report.
8  See Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2018-2021): 
the Banco de España’s contribution to the Eurosystem’s December 2018 
joint forecasting exercise.
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will also be shaped by the various assumptions on which the 
projections are based. These include interest rates following an 
upward path – steeper in the case of longer maturities – in line with 
market expectations, the oil price following a slightly downward 
path (indicated by futures markets), exchange rates remaining at 
current levels, and the Spanish economy’s external markets 
growing at an annual average of 3.5%.
Meanwhile, the projections anticipate the values of elasticity of 
imports to final demand to be similar to those observed in the last 
two years, in turn somewhat higher than in the early years of the 
recovery, and that exports will make further gains in external 
market share, although smaller than those in the period 2014-
2016. This somewhat less favourable behaviour by external trade 
flows may reflect the fact that competitiveness gains relative to the 
rest of the world have tended to slow and that stronger domestic 
demand means Spanish companies are facing less pressure to 
find new markets.9
With these ingredients, the Spanish economy’s lending capacity is 
expected to further moderate somewhat over the three year period 
from 2019 to 2021 (by around 0.4  pp of GDP), which would be 
explained in equal parts by a modest additional reduction in the 
balance of goods and services and a certain expansion in the income 
deficit (driven by the rising cost of the economy’s external debt).
In short, the reduction in net lending observed over the course of 
2018 is due to a convergence of a variety of different factors, such 
BOX 5 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY’S REST OF THE WORLD ACCOUNT (cont’d)
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
a 2018 data calculated as the sum of the data for the 12 months to September.
b The energy and non-energy balances are Banco de España estimates based on customs data.
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ENERGY GOODS BALANCE AND OIL PRICE
9  See Almunia, M., P. Antràs, D. Lopez-Rodriguez, E. Morales (2018) 
“Venting Out: Exports during a Domestic Slump,” Working Papers, No. 
1844, Banco de España.
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as the appreciation of the euro, rising oil prices, the slowdown in 
world trade flows, and a degree of recovery of import penetration 
in final demand. Some of these factors may have only a passing 
impact, such that if the variables concerned (such as the oil price 
or exchange rate) remain close to their current values, no further 
deterioration is to be expected. However, the existence of signs 
of a partial reversal in 2017 and 2018 of the more (less) 
expansionary behaviour shown by exports (imports) in relation to 
their determinants between the start of the recovery and 2016 
may perhaps indicate that the process of competitiveness gains 
under way since the start of the recovery has lost momentum, in 
a context in which the Spanish economy needs to run broad 
external surpluses to reduce its external debt from its current high 
levels.
BOX 5 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY’S REST OF THE WORLD ACCOUNT (cont’d)
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NON-ENERGY GOODS AND SERVICES BALANCE AND THE OUTPUT GAP
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
a 2018 data calculated as the sum of the data for the 12 months to September.
b The energy and non-energy balances are Banco de España estimates based on customs data.
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In recent years, demographic pressure, both observed and 
expected, and the impact of the recent economic crisis on Social 
Security accounts (see Chart 1) have given rise to several reforms 
that seek to maintain the financial sustainability of the system, the 
last of which was approved in 2013.1 This reform introduced two 
automatic mechanisms for adjusting pension expenditure. First, a 
new Pension Revaluation Index (PRI) was created, replacing the 
previous CPI-indexation system. This index, which has been in 
force since 2014, links annual pension increases to the financial 
situation of the pension system: if the system records a deficit, 
pension increases are capped at 0.25%. The PRI also sets a 
maximum increase of CPI growth in December of the preceding 
year plus 0.5%. In practice, between 2014 and 2017, application 
of the PRI has given rise to annual increases of 0.25%. Second, 
the “sustainability factor” (envisaged in the 2011 reform)2 was 
established, whereby starting pension would be linked to the 
observed increase in life expectancy at the age of 67, so that the 
greater the increase in life expectancy, the lower the starting 
pension.3 This factor was to come into effect in 2019.
The innovations described above helped to significantly improve 
the long-term sustainability of the system, as reflected in the 
projected pension expenditure for the Spanish economy included 
in the latest European Commission report on ageing.4 However, in 
the absence of further legal changes in income or expenditure, the 
counterpoint to this enhanced sustainability would be a gradual 
decrease in the ratio of average pension to average wages in order 
to offset the negative effects of the dependency ratio (see Chart 2), 
essentially by operation of the automatic adjustment mechanisms 
introduced in 2013 and, in particular, the PRI. Thus, in the absence 
of further legal changes, the projections would entail annual 
pension revaluation of 0.25%, the minimum rate set, for much of 
the next three decades. With inflation rates around 2% – the ECB’s 
medium-term benchmark – this would entail a gradual erosion of 
pensioners’ purchasing power as they grow older (see Chart 3).
However, in the State Budget Law for 2018 (Law 6/2018 of 3 July 
2018), a series of measures were adopted that modify the 
application of both the above-mentioned automatic adjustment 
mechanisms, with a significant impact on the pension system 
accounts. First, the Budget Law stipulated a pension increase in 
2018 and 2019 above the 0.25% that would result from applying 
the PRI (see Chart 4). Specifically, an increase of 1.6% was set for 
all pensions in 2018, and if no alternative agreement is reached by 
the committee responsible for monitoring and evaluating the 
Toledo Pact agreements, that same increase will also apply in 
2019. Moreover, minimum and non-contributory pensions rose by 
an additional 1.4% in 2018. Lastly, in terms of pension revaluation, 
the Budget Law for 2018 raised the regulatory base of pensions 
for widow(er)s receiving no other income from 52% to 56% in 
2018 and from 56% to 60% in 2019. Second, in the case of the 
sustainability factor, its entry into force was postponed until the 
Toledo Pact committee comes to a new agreement, or until 2023 
at the latest.
Compared with the scenario of a 0.25% increase in pensions 
according to the PRI, the present government estimates that, in 
the near term, the revaluation measures will entail additional 
expenditure of some €2.5 billion in 2018 and some €5.3 billion 
(0.4% of GDP) in 2019.5 In turn, on Banco de España estimates, 
postponing the entry into force of the sustainability factor until 
2023 would entail an increase in annual pension expenditure of 
0.1 pp of GDP on average over the next decade (2020-30) and of 
0.3 pp over the following decade. This higher expenditure would 
be a result of the increase in average pension for the cohorts 
retiring between 2019 and 2022, which are now exempt from 
application of the sustainability factor, and for the cohorts retiring 
after 2023, for which the four-year delay in application of the factor 
would entail a higher starting pension.
More recently, the Toledo Pact parliamentary committee reached 
an agreement whereby pensions will be revalued, in general, 
according to observed CPI, which would mean eliminating the 
current PRI. The potential implications of this agreement for 
pension expenditure in the long term are much greater than those 
stemming from the measures already adopted in the Budget Law 
for 2018. Specifically, compared with the scenario in which the 
2013 reform is applied, a simulation of the impact on pension 
expenditure in the period 2018-50 of a scenario in which average 
pension is linked to the CPI and the sustainability factor comes 
into force in 2023 gives an increase in pension expenditure of 
1.9 pp of GDP in 2030 and 3.4 pp in 2050 (see Charts 5 and 6).6, 7 
BOX 6 RECENT PENSION SYSTEM MEASURES: ANALYSIS OF IMPACT ON PUBLIC FINANCES
1  Law 23/2013 of 23 December 2013 regulating the Sustainability Factor 
and the Social Security Pension System Revaluation Index. 
2  Law 27/2011 of 1 August 2011 updating, adapting and modernising the 
Social Security system.  
3  Thus, in cumulative terms, the more years during which a pension is 
received would be offset by the lower pension level.
4  European Commission, The 2018 Ageing Report, May 2018.
5  According to the 2019 Draft Budgetary Plan sent to the European 
Commission on 15 October.
6  The accounting exercise projects future pension expenditure based on 
assumptions relating to the number of pensions and the average pension 
amount, considering that the average amount differs for new pensions, 
pensions leaving the system and existing pensions. Each year, the 
number of pensions multiplied by their average amount determines the 
total system expenditure, expressed in the charts as a percentage of 
nominal GDP. Higher pension revaluation results in higher average 
pensions both for those already in the system and for those leaving it, 
generating a net increase in pension expenditure. Assumptions on the 
behaviour of the different variables are based on the European 
Commission’s 2018 Ageing Report. Specifically, on average in the period 
2018-50, real GDP is expected to grow by 1.2%, inflation by 2%, wages 
by 3.3% and the number of pensions by 1.6%. Lastly, the effect of the 
sustainability factor on the average pension of new entrants is also taken 
into account.
7  A recent paper, based on an overlapping generation model with 
heterogeneous agents, placed the higher pension expenditure in a 
scenario of CPI indexation and non-application of the sustainability 
factor at between 3 pp and 3.6 pp of GDP on average over the next five 
decades, peaking at more than 5 pp of GDP in 2060 (see De la Fuente, 
A., M. A. García Díaz and A. R. Sánchez, 2018: “¿Hacia una nueva 
reforma de las pensiones? Notas para el Pacto de Toledo.” Fedea Policy 
Papers 2018/09).
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Although these simulations are subject to a not insignificant degree of 
uncertainty, given the length of the time horizon considered, it may be 
concluded that, under the projected demographic and macroeconomic 
scenario, the recent pension system measures adopted will require 
further steps either to increase the income or reduce the expenditure 
of the system in order to guarantee its financial sustainability. 
BOX 6
 
RECENT PENSION SYSTEM MEASURES: ANALYSIS OF IMPACT ON PUBLIC FINANCES (cont’d)
SOURCES: Seguridad Social, European Commission (The 2018 Ageing Report) and Banco de España.
a For 2018 and 2019, Banco de España projections published in June 2018.
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On 28 November the ECB published the results of the 19th round 
of the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises in the euro 
area (SAFE), covering the period from April 2018 to September 
2018. The survey asks respondent firms, essentially small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), about changes in this period in 
their economic and financial situation, their external financing 
needs and the conditions under which they have obtained or not 
such financing. 
In the case of Spanish SMEs, the data for this latest round of the 
survey show, overall, that the improvement in their economic 
situation has continued, although there are some signs of a slight 
slowdown. The number of firms reporting an increase in sales 
once again exceeded those indicating the contrary, which has 
happened uninterruptedly since 2014. In this case the relative 
difference between the two groups (net percentage) of 24% is 
slightly higher than in the previous round (20%, see Chart 1) and 
similar to that for the euro area (25%). The profit performance was 
less favourable, owing to the increase both in labour and other 
costs, a circumstance that was reported by a high net proportion 
of SMEs in the sample (50% and 66%, respectively, compared 
with 51% and 57% in the euro area). Thus, the proportion of firms 
that reported an increase in profits was 2 pp higher than those that 
stated the opposite, which was 2 pp lower than in the previous 
round. This difference was 3 pp in the euro area, 1 pp lower than 
six months earlier.
A lack of customers was cited as the main source of concern by 
28% of Spanish SMEs (see Chart 2), while in the euro area, for a 
large number of firms (26%), it was a shortage of skilled labour. Set 
against this, access to financing was, among all the factors 
considered, once again that signalled by the fewest companies: 
6% in Spain and 7% in the euro area, which are slightly lower 
percentages than in the previous round but represent historical 
lows in both areas since the survey began. 
Against this background, the proportion of Spanish SMEs that 
applied for bank loans fell slightly, by 1 pp, to 28% (see Chart 3), 
which is marginally higher than that recorded in the euro area 
(27%). In turn, the availability of bank financing continued to 
improve (see Chart 4). Thus, in net terms, 21% of Spanish SMEs 
reported an improvement in this aspect, 3  pp less than in the 
previous survey, and 10 pp more than the figure for their euro area 
peers. The firms surveyed perceived that most of the factors 
affecting the availability of bank loans performed favourably, albeit 
to a lesser degree than in the previous six months.1 Specifically, in 
net terms, 27% of firms perceived a greater willingness of banks 
to grant loans (a figure 6  pp lower than that recorded in the 
previous round of the survey) and 17% reported an improvement 
in their specific situation (8 pp less than six months earlier). By 
contrast, macroeconomic expectations seem to no longer have a 
positive effect on access to bank loans since the proportion of 
SMEs which think that the economic outlook has worsened is 
somewhat higher (by 1  pp) than that which considers it has 
improved, whereas six months earlier the latter amply exceeded 
the former (by 24 pp). 
The percentage of Spanish SMEs whose bank loan applications 
were rejected increased slightly by 1 pp to stand at 6%, a figure 
somewhat higher than that recorded in the euro area as a whole 
(5%). The broader indicator of the difficulties in obtaining bank 
loans2 shows a slight deterioration. Thus, the difficulties affected 
9% of these companies which was 1 pp higher than the figure for 
the euro area and that recorded in the previous round of the survey 
(see Chart 5).
As regards financing conditions, the net percentage of firms 
reporting a decline in interest rates was positive for the eighth time 
running; it was, however, very low at 1% and 4 pp down from the 
previous round (see Chart 6). The net proportion of companies 
indicating an increase in loan amounts was also positive (15%, 
4 pp up on six months earlier), as was that indicating a lengthening 
of maturities (5%, compared with -2% recorded six months 
earlier). By contrast, 6% of Spanish SMEs as a whole perceived a 
tightening in the collateral required, and 17% in other terms and 
conditions of loans.
In short, the latest round of the SAFE shows that from April 2018 
to September 2018, the access of Spanish SMEs to external 
financing continued to improve. The firms reported, as a whole, 
that during that period they detected an increase in the 
availability of bank financing, bolstered by a greater willingness 
of banks to grant loans with favourable conditions and by the 
improvement in their specific situation. In particular, their 
financial and economic situation continued to improve, although 
some signs of a slight slowdown are perceptible. Finally, the 
survey also shows that Spanish SMEs expected that their 
access to bank credit would improve from October 2018 to 
March 2019, albeit at a more moderate pace than in previous 
rounds.
BOX 7 RECENT CHANGES IN ACCESS OF SPANISH SMEs TO EXTERNAL FINANCING IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE ECB’S HALF-YEARLY SURVEY
1  The availability of bank loans is the perception that firms have of their 
access to financing, which is affected by supply-side (relating to banks), 
demand-side (the firm’s creditworthiness) and macroeconomic factors 
(general economic situation).
2  This indicator captures companies in the following situations: those 
whose applications for funds were rejected, those to which the funds 
were granted but only in part, companies to which loans were granted 
but at a cost deemed by the companies to be very high and those which 
did not apply for financing because they believed it would not be granted 
to them.
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BOX 7 RECENT CHANGES IN ACCESS OF SPANISH SMEs TO EXTERNAL FINANCING IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE ECB’S HALF-YEARLY SURVEY (cont’d)
SOURCE: European Central Bank.
a Percentage of firms indicating an increase less the percentage of those indicating a decrease.
b Percentage of firms indicating an improvement less the percentage of those indicating a deterioration.
c This indicator captures the proportion of firms that are in one of the following situations: those whose loan applications were rejected, those whose loans were 
granted but only in part, those whose loans were granted but at a cost deemed by the firms to be very high and those who did not apply for financing because 
they thought it would not be granted to them (fear of rejection).
d Percentage of firms indicating better conditions (lower interest rates, higher amounts, longer maturities, less demanding collateral and other required conditions) 
less the percentage of firms indicating worse conditions.
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2 THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY
In 2018 Q3, global activity remained buoyant, although there were signs of deceleration. 
Specifically, global GDP is estimated to have grown by around 3% year-on-year, as compared 
with 4% in Q2. Moreover, widening divergences between areas were discernible. The United 
States and emerging Asia posted higher growth rates than other regions. As regards world 
trade, the Q3 goods trade data show a quarter-on-quarter increase of 1.4%, after the stagnation 
seen in the previous quarter. The bringing forward of transactions to before the entry into force 
in September of the new US tariffs on Chinese imports appears to have contributed to this 
recovery in trade, which was especially strong in the Asian economies, meaning that the upturn 
can be expected to be temporary. Indeed, the monthly fall in trade in September and the highest 
frequency leading indicators tend to confirm this. The above-mentioned tariffs are charged at a 
rate of 10% on US imports from China worth $200 billion. They were due to be raised to 25% 
in January 2019, but the US and Chinese presidents agreed at the G20 summit in late November 
to postpone this rise by three months, to allow time for the negotiation of a trade agreement. 
International financial markets have also showed differing behaviour during the current 
quarter, with strong corrections in the advanced-economy stock markets and a certain 
flattening in those of the emerging market economies (see Chart 2.1). In the developed 
economies, the stock market losses have been a consequence of the poorer growth outlook, 
partly resulting from trade tensions, and of the uncertainty associated with the budget 
problems in Italy and the outcome of the Brexit negotiations. The interest rate on ten-year 
bonds has fallen in the United States to around 2.85%, from over 3.20% in mid-October (see 
Chart 2.3). On the foreign exchange markets, the dollar has continued to appreciate against 
the other major developed currencies. The greater stability of the emerging markets, following 
the deterioration in Q3, has been especially pronounced in those economies that had 
previously displayed most vulnerability, such as Argentina and Turkey. On the other hand, 
Asian stock markets – affected by trade tensions – behaved less favourably.
The commodities price index has risen by 2% during Q4, with the rises in metal and food 
prices offsetting the falls in textile and, above all, oil prices (see Chart 2.4). The price of 
Brent crude has fallen from over $80 per barrel at the beginning of October to around $60, 
owing to the outlook of lower world demand and higher-than-expected supply, due to the 
increase in production in the United States and the exemptions from the sanctions imposed 
on Iran. At the beginning of December, OPEC and Russia decided to cut their production 
of oil in an attempt to stabilise prices.
As regards the main developed economies, GDP growth in the United States was 3.5% in 
Q3, in annualised quarter-on-quarter terms, down from 4.2% in Q2 (see Chart 3.1). With 
regard to its composition, there were notable negative contributions from investment and 
net exports, which may be anticipating a turning point in the cycle (see Box 1). In Japan, 
the fall in GDP in Q3 of 2.5%, in annualised quarter-on-quarter terms, was attributable to 
the natural disasters in the period, while in the United Kingdom, the quarter-on-quarter 
GDP growth of 0.6% was based on private consumption, with the weakness of investment, 
which appears to be reflecting the impact of Brexit, persisting. Monetary policy was 
unchanged in the advanced economies, against a background of gradually rising overall 
inflation rates and flat core rates (see Charts 3.2 and 3.4).
Activity developments in the emerging economies were varied. GDP growth edged down in Q3 
in China, from 6.7% year-on-year to 6.5% (see Chart 4.1), against a background in which the 
2.1  The external 
environment of the 
euro area
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authorities attempted to use economic stimulus policies to offset the effects of the trade 
confrontation with the United States. In India, growth remained highly buoyant in the same 
period, albeit slowing by somewhat more than one percentage point, to 7.2%. Argentina and 
Turkey, the economies most severely affected by financial tensions during the year, suffered a 
considerable decline in activity over the summer, as a result of the financial instability and 
economic policy adjustments. In the other Latin American economies, the Q3 activity data show 
a mild recovery, although with significant divergence across countries. While Brazil and Mexico 
showed signs of improvement, activity in Chile, Peru and Colombia slowed. Box 2 analyses the 
vulnerabilities in the emerging market economies, focusing on China, Mexico and Brazil.
At the beginning of 2018, economic activity in the euro area was affected by a variety of 
temporary factors (such as strikes and bad weather) that had a negative impact on 
growth. The impact of temporary factors increased in Q3, when the changes to the 
regulation of emissions in the automotive industry led to a contraction in the production 
of motor vehicles, especially in Germany.2 However, the information available suggests 
SOURCE: IFS and Banco de España.
a An increase in the index denotes an appreciation of the currency.
b Ten-year government debt yields.
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2  The production of motor vehicles declined during the summer months in some euro area countries, principally 
Germany, as a result of adaptation to the new emissions testing regulation, known as WLTP (Worldwide 
Harmonised Light Vehicles Test Procedure), that came into force in Europe for newly registered vehicles on 1 
September). This reduction in the production of motor vehicles during the summer was basically reflected in a 
contraction of exports and private consumption and, in some countries (such as Germany) was accompanied by 
a build-up in inventories above their desired level (see Box 4).
2.2  The euro area and 
the monetary policy 
of the European 
Central Bank
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
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that, even allowing for these temporary effects, the euro area growth rate has slowed 
significantly in comparison with 2017. In terms of the components of demand, this 
slowdown is attributable to the weakness of exports, which were held back by the 
levelling-off of world trade, against a background of greater uncertainty, arising from the 
drift towards protectionism in some economies and the fact that the terms of the final 
Brexit agreement are still unknown, and possibly by the delayed effects of appreciation 
of the euro. In contrast, domestic demand was steadier, supported by the favourable 
financial conditions, the buoyancy of employment and the growth of household and 
corporate income. However, business investment slowed notably in Q3, which may be 
a sign that the environment of uncertainty, which has already caused business 
confidence to decline, is beginning to be passed through to businesses’ investment 
decisions. In addition, financial tensions remain heightened in Italy, against a background 
of uncertainty regarding the economic policy stance and a recent deterioration in 
economic growth.
In this context, the Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections, published in mid-
December, revised the growth projected for 2018 and 2019 slightly downwards, to 1.9% 
and 1.7%, respectively, with the projection for GDP growth in 2020 standing at 1.7% and 
that for 2021 at 1.5% (see Table 2). Even so, euro area GDP is expected to continue to 
grow at somewhat above its potential rate over the projection horizon. In line with the 
lower projected growth and the persistence of subdued price increases, expected core 
SOURCES: IFS and Banco de España.
a Percentage of labour force.
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inflation (excluding energy and food) was revised slightly downwards, to 1.4% in 2019 and 
1.6% in 2020, before it reaches 1.8% in 2021. Meanwhile, the path projected for the 
consumer price index was revised downwards by 0.1 pp in 2019, in line with the recent 
reduction in oil prices, with CPI inflation projected to be 1.8% in 2021.
The slowdown in growth observed since the start of the year, in a setting of more prominent 
downside risks, highlights the need to retain the current monetary stimulus, so as to ensure 
convergence by inflation on its medium-term reference. Against this background, the 
December ECB Governing Council confirmed, on the one hand, the end of net asset 
purchases under the APP programme at the end of the year, as it had first announced in 
June, subject to its analysis of economic developments. But, on the other, it indicated that 
it intends to continue reinvesting, in full, the principal payments from maturing assets 
purchased under the programme for an extended period of time past the date when it starts 
SOURCES: IFS, Banco de España, IMF and JP Morgan.
a The aggregate of the different areas has been calculated using the weight of the countries that make up these areas in the world economy, drawing on IMF 
information.
b Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
c Malaysia, Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Singapore, Philippines and Taiwan.
d Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania and, from July 2013, Croatia.
e JP Morgan EMBI spreads. Latin America includes Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. Asia includes China, Indonesia, 
Iraq, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philiippines, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. The data on the new EU Member States relate to Hungary, Poland, Romania and, from 
July 2013, Croatia.
f A decrease in the index denotes a depreciation of the currency against the dollar.
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raising the ECB interest rate and, in any case, for as long as necessary to maintain favourable 
liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation. Furthermore, the 
Council does not anticipate any changes in the short run in policy interest rates, which are 
expected to remain at their present levels at least until the end of the summer of 2019.3
On National Accounts figures, euro area GDP grew by 0.2% quarter-on-quarter in 2018 
Q3, 0.2 pp below the rates recorded in the first two quarters of the year (see Table 3 and 
Chart 5) and very much below the rates of growth of close to 0.7% posted in 2017. As 
indicated at the start of this sub-section, the year-on-year growth rate was 1.6%, compared 
with 2.2% in Q2. A substantial part of this slowdown in the economy over the summer may 
be explained by an exceptional temporary effect linked to the decline in car manufacturing. 
This was especially marked in Germany, where GDP fell by 0.2%, after growing by 0.5% 
in Q2. GDP also declined in Italy, by 0.1%. By contrast, GDP accelerated in France, to 
0.4%, while in Spain GDP growth held steady at 0.6%. The reason, by component, for this 
slowdown in GDP was the fall-back in exports and the weak increase in private demand 
(both household consumption and investment in capital goods), while the contribution of 
SOURCES: ECB, European Commission, Consensus Forecast, IMF, MJ Economics and OECD.
020291028102
GDP HICP GDP HICP GDP HICP
European Central Bank (December 2018) 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7
European Commission (November 2018) 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6
9.16.19.18.18.19.1)8102 rebmevoN( DCEO
International Monetary Fund (Octubre 2018) 2.0 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.8
Consensus Forecast (December 2018) 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.6 — —
——7.17.18.10.2)8102 rebmevoN( retemoraboruE
EURO AREA GDP AND HICP GROWTH PROJECTIONS TABLE 2
SOURCES: Eurostat, ECB and Banco de España.
a Information available up to 17 December 2018.
b Average for the quarter. Latest figure available: October 2018.
c End of the period. Latest available figure: November 2018.
81027102
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National Accounts (quarter-on-quarter rate)
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Contributions to quarter-on-quarter change in GDP (pp)
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EURO AREA ECONOMIC INDICATORS (a) TABLE 3
3  The main refinancing rate, the marginal lending facility rate and the deposit facility rate stand at 0%, 0.25% and 
-0.40 %, respectively.
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SOURCES: Eurostat, Markit Economics and Banco de España.
a Ireland is not included owing to the high volatility of its data.
b Year-on year rates, calculated on the basis of the non-centred quarterly moving average of the seasonally adjusted series.
c Normalised series.
d Bank Lending Survey. Indicator = percentage of banks reporting a considerable increase + percentage of banks reporting some increase × 0.5 – percentage 
of banks reporting some decrease × 0.5 – percentage of banks reporting a considerable decrease. A positive value denotes an increase.
e Year-on year rates, calculated on the basis of the non-centred quarterly moving average of the original series.
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stocks increased, and was indeed very high in some countries (in Germany, 0.6 pp). Euro 
area employment remained strong in 2018 Q3, up 1.3% year-on-year. 
The short-term economic information available for Q4 points, in general, to a small rebound 
in GDP growth, but within a framework of modest growth (see Chart  5). The business 
confidence indicators based on the Purchasing Managers (PMI) surveys have declined in 
Q4 both in industry and services, although they are still in growth territory. The indicators 
compiled by the European Commission for those two sectors point in the same direction, 
with values above the historical mean, while those for the construction sector remain 
strong. In addition, consumer confidence decreased sharply in November, and the 
component relating to job creation expectations declined both in industry and services but 
improved in construction. As regards external demand, export expectations and the 
assessment of export orders continued to worsen in the last stretch of the year (entering 
negative territory according to the PMI index). Meanwhile, the quantitative indicators 
available, with more lagged information, generally confirm a slightly more favourable 
performance in Q4. Specifically, vehicle registrations rose in October and November, as 
did retail sales (October figures only). On the supply side, the industrial production index 
SOURCES: Eurostat, Reuters and ECB.
a Implied inflation calculated on the basis of inflation swaps.
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excluding energy was 0.4% higher in October than in the previous month and the 
unemployment rate in October held steady at 8.1% for the fourth consecutive month.
Turning to prices, inflation as measured by the HICP has remained around 2% in recent 
months. The year-on-year rate of growth in November was 1.9%, 0.3  pp less than in 
October, owing to the slowdown in all its components with the exception of non-energy 
industrial goods prices which maintained their rate of growth (see Chart 6). In turn, core 
inflation (measured by the headline index excluding energy and food) fell by 0.1 pp to 1%. 
By contrast, wage settlements have continued to increase notably in recent months. 
In November, the European Commission set out its economic priorities for 2019 within the 
framework of the European Semester and completed its assessment of the draft budgets 
prepared by the Member States for the coming year. It also published the annual edition of 
the Alert Mechanism Report in the context of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure.
In the fiscal sphere, the draft budgets for 2019 project an increase in the general government 
deficit for the euro area as a whole, up to 0.8% of GDP, from the estimated level of 0.6% 
for 2018. Government debt is expected to fall to 85% of GDP in 2019, compared with 87% 
in 2018. In structural terms, it is anticipated that the fiscal policy stance will be slightly 
expansionary in 2019, following the neutral stance finally estimated for 2018, even though 
the budgetary plans pointed to a certain degree of fiscal expansion (see Box 3). The 
European Commission has called on the Council to launch an excessive deficit procedure 
against Italy, owing to particularly serious non-compliance by the Italian budget with the 
commitments to reduce debt and contain expenditure. This has led the Italian government 
to reconsider some of the planned measures. The European Commission also considered 
that the budget plans of Belgium, France, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain pose a high risk of 
departing significantly from their medium-term budgetary objectives and that, except in 
the case of Slovenia, they will breach their debt reduction commitment. In the case of 
France, the plan does not include the government’s recently announced measures to 
increase expenditure.
On the basis of the Alert Mechanism Report in the context of the Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure, the European Commission considers that in-depth reviews (IRDs) should be 
undertaken in the eight euro area member states where imbalances were identified during 
the last European Semester, namely the five largest euro area economies – Germany, Spain, 
France, Italy and the Netherlands – plus Cyprus, Ireland and Portugal. Greece will also be 
subject to an in-depth review, having exited the financial assistance programme in August.
The Euro Summit in December endorsed all the elements of the Eurogroup’s report on 
EMU deepening. In particular, it was agreed that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
would be strengthened and that it would act as the common backstop to the Single 
Resolution Fund (SRF) in the event that it lacked sufficient resources to address bank 
resolution processes. An agreement was also reached on strengthening the preventive 
instruments available to the ESM. In addition, it was agreed to introduce new class-action 
clauses (CACs) in sovereign debt issued from 2022 to facilitate, where necessary, possible 
debt restructuring. By contrast, no significant progress was made either in the design of a 
European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) or in the introduction of a common budget or 
cyclical stability mechanism, although the Eurogroup was entrusted with continuing to 
work on the design of an instrument within the EU budget framework conducive to 
convergence and competitiveness in the euro area. Lastly, the Council approved the 
Banking Package which aims to reduce risks in the banking sector.
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High levels of instability persisted in the euro area financial markets over the course of 
Q4, affected not only by the Brexit negotiations but also by developments in the 
European Commission’s review of the Italian budget (see Chart 7). However, changes in 
euro area financial conditions have been very contained in the quarter as a whole, with 
small increases in sovereign spreads, falls in stock market prices and a slight 
depreciation of the euro both against large economy and emerging market economy 
currencies.
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS 
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Estimated by the ECB using swap market data.
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The small but widespread increase in spreads over the 10-year German bund is partly due 
to the decline in the 10-year German bond yield, which stood at 0.25% at the cut-off date 
for this report. By contrast, in the case of Italy, the spread has narrowed by 7 bp in Q4, 
although it remains high at around 270 bp. The spread between the German and the US 
bond yield has reached 265 bp, close to the level recorded at end-September.
On the stock markets, the EURO STOXX 50 has fallen sharply in the quarter overall, down 
almost 10% (with a cumulative decline of 12% in the year), in line with the drop in US stock 
markets in Q4. Banking sector stock prices in the euro area have fallen by almost 15% in 
the quarter as a whole.
On the currency markets, the nominal effective exchange rate of the euro has fallen by 
1.3% in Q4, after rising by a similar figure in Q3 (see Chart 7.6). By currency, the euro has 
depreciated by 2% against the US dollar and has appreciated by 1.3% against sterling. 
The euro has depreciated sharply against various emerging market currencies: 12.5% 
against the Turkish lira, 6.2% against the Argentine peso and 1.8% against the Chinese 
yuan.
Lastly, the rate of growth of lending to non-financial corporations decelerated by 0.4 pp in 
October, to 3.9% year-on-year, while the rate of growth of lending to households held 
steady at 3.2% year-on-year (see Chart 8). The euro area bank lending survey for 2018 Q3 
suggests that lending growth continues to be underpinned, in all categories, by an increase 
in demand, an easing of credit standards and an improvement in financing conditions. 
Regarding monetary aggregates, the rate of growth of M3 rose by 0.3 pp in October, to 
3.9% year-on-year, while the rate of growth of M1, the narrowest aggregate, held steady 
at 6.8% year-on-year.
SOURCE: ECB.
a Adjusted for securitisation and other transfers.
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3 THE SPANISH ECONOMY
Spain’s GDP grew at a quarter-on-quarter rate of 0.6% in 2018 Q3, a similar rate to that 
observed in the preceding quarter (see Chart 9). The expansion in output over the period 
July-September was solely due to increasing domestic demand, which maintained its 
positive contribution at 0.8 pp. The acceleration in (private and public) consumption and 
residential investment offset the slowdown in other investment components (equipment 
and other goods and other structures). Conversely, net external demand continued to 
make a negative contribution, similar to that in Q2, at 0.2 pp. The decline in exports was 
slightly larger than that in imports, following modest progress by both variables in the 
period from April to June. In year-on-year terms, both GDP and employment continued to 
grow at a rate of 2.5%.
The available short-term economic data points to GDP growth in the fourth quarter again 
being around 0.6%. Increased output is expected to be further supported by growing 
domestic demand, with the contribution of external demand – for which only very limited 
information is yet available – being virtually zero. Employment, however, will gradually 
slow.
So far in the last quarter of 2018 the behaviour of domestic financial markets has basically 
been driven by external factors. These have led to falling stock-market indices, which have 
been more pronounced in the case of bank shares, with a moderate rise in volatility and 
credit risk premia. Thus, at the cut-off date of this report, the IBEX-35 had dropped by 
6.1% relative to end-September levels, which was less negative than the EUROSTOXX 50, 
which had dropped by 9.9% over the same period (see Chart 10.1). In the sovereign-debt 
market, ten-year Spanish bond yields stood at 1.4%, approximately 10 bp below their 
level at end-Q3. This was a more moderate drop than that in the yield on the equivalent 
German bond, such that the spread between them widened to 115 bp. Average risk premia 
on private fixed-income securities picked up by almost 10  bp in the case of financial 
corporations and around 5 bp in that of non-financial corporations. In the interbank market 
the twelve-month EURIBOR rose slightly, but remains in negative territory at -0.13%.
Financing conditions for households and non-financial corporations have remained loose, 
with the cost of debt still low. In this context, new lending volumes have continued to 
expand in recent months. In terms of outstanding balances, the positive rate of growth of 
lending to households has consolidated. In the case of funding raised by companies, in a 
context of low borrowing needs, bank lending has continued to contract moderately, while 
fixed-income security issuance has accelerated. Lastly, the financial position of households 
and non-financial corporations continued to strengthen in the third quarter of the year.
Based on the available short-term economic information, the quarter-on-quarter rate of 
change in household consumer spending is estimated at around 0.6% in Q4, similar to 
growth in Q3 (see Chart 11). The indicators appearing since publication of the September 
report suggest certain upside risks in the near term. First of all, both the retail price index 
and the consumer goods industrial production index (IPI) accelerated markedly in October 
after their weakness in previous months. Moreover, social security registrations also 
showed a slight upturn in growth in Q4. Lastly, qualitative indicators, such as the services 
and consumer goods manufacturing PMI, or the retail trade confidence index, have tended 
to perform more positively in the last two months.
3.1  Household spending 
decisions
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As regards housing investments, the most recent indicators suggest that the growth rate 
in the fourth quarter was similar to that over the period July-September. Meanwhile, the 
data published by the INE on unsubsidised housing prices showed an acceleration in Q3, 
rising to a year-on-year rate of 7.2%, 0.4 pp higher than the previous quarter. Faster price 
rises affected both the new and used housing segments.
Households’ borrowing costs remained low. Thus, the average interest rate applied to new 
lending for house purchase stood at 2.2% in October (the latest available figure), a figure 
close to that in previous months. For their part, consumer credit and other lending was 
6.6% on the same date, around 20 bp higher than the average for the preceding three 
months. This change basically reflected the upturn in the other lending segment4 and is 
within the usual range of variation of this series (see Chart 10.2).
According to the October BLS, financial institutions further eased lending standards for 
households for consumption and other purposes in Q3, while they remained unchanged in 
the housing purchase segment.5 Moreover, general conditions applicable to consumer 
credit and other lending also eased (specifically, margins on average loans, as maturities 
shortened), while loans for housing purchases remained unchanged. On the demand side, 
the BLS shows that households’ applications for funds rose in 2018 Q3 (particularly in the 
consumer credit and other lending segment). It also showed them to be still rising in the 
last quarter of the year, while the credit supply further eased.
This context of favourable conditions for access to financing continued to support the 
expansion of new lending volumes in recent months. The legal uncertainty over stamp 
duty does not seem to have affected the volume of new lending for housing purchase in 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Seasonally adjusted series.
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4  This segment includes loans to households for purposes other than consumer credit or housing, such as 
business (i.e. sole proprietors), debt consolidation and education, and all lending to non-profit institutions serving 
households. For more information, see Banco de España Circular 4/2017 of 27 November 2017 to credit 
institutions on public and confidential financial information rules and formats.
5  For more details, see the Analytical Article “The October 2018 Bank Lending Survey in Spain”, Economic Bulletin, 
4/2018, Banco de España.
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October, which continued to grow at rates similar to those in previous months. Progress in 
lending activity contributed to the rate of year-on-year growth in households’ outstanding 
debt balance6 rising to 0.4% in October, 0.3 pp higher than in June (see Chart 10.3). By 
purposes, this was the result of the slowdown in lending for housing purchase continuing 
its trend towards moderation shown since the start of the year (to 1.5% in October, 
compared with 1.8% in June), together with an increase in the rate of progress of consumer 
credit and other lending (0.3 pp, to 6.2%), as a consequence of the increased dynamism 
of the other lending segment, given that consumer credit slowed slightly.
On the latest available data, households’ financial position continued to strengthen during 
2018 Q3. Thus, the debt and debt burden ratios relative to gross disposable income (GDI) 
SOURCES: Reuters, Datastream, MSCI, INE and Banco de España.
a The cost of equity is based on the three-stage Gordon dividend discount model.
b Includes off-balance-sheet securitisation and loans transferred to Sareb.
c Loans from resident credit institutions and specialised lending institutions.
d Includes loans from non-residents and the issuance of debt securities (including that by resident subsidiaries).
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seem to have continued to fall (see Chart 12.1). Net household wealth is estimated to have 
increased once more in 2018 Q3, as a result of the appreciation of households’ real estate 
assets, which offset the decrease in their financial wealth, the latter influenced by the fact 
that the decline in assets outpaced that in liabilities (see Chart 12.2).
Business activity, proxied by the real value added of the market economy, appears to have 
grown at a slightly faster pace in 2018 Q4 than in the period July-September, the most 
notable feature being the acceleration of industry and energy.
Regarding business investment, the capital goods component is estimated to have 
increased by around 0.8% quarter-on-quarter in 2018 Q4, down on its growth in Q3 (2.2%, 
see Chart 13). The available information is still scant, but the recent behaviour of the 
quantitative indicators, relating to October, such as the capital goods IPI and commercial 
vehicle registrations, points to this development. For its part, investment in intangible 
assets appears to have picked up somewhat following its unfavourable performance in 
Q3.
3.2  Business activity and 
investment 
SOURCES: INE, European Commission, ANFAC, Centro de Información Estadística del Notariado and Banco de España.
a Quarter-on-quarter rates calculated using seasonally adjusted series.
b Rates of change of moving average of three terms with three time lags, calculated using the seasonally adjusted series. The dots represent quarter-on-quarter 
rates.
c Normalised indicators (difference between the indicator and its mean value, divided by the standard deviation).
d 12-month moving sum.
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In the last few months, the cost of bank financing to non-financial corporations has 
remained low. Thus in October the average interest rate on new bank loans below €1 million 
was 2.9%, some 30 bp above the average for the previous three months, a rise which 
seems to reflect seasonal factors in the behaviour of bank fees. The interest rate on loans 
above €1 million was 1.4%, an all-time low. Meanwhile, the estimated cost of equity seems 
to have decreased in recent months to 9.2% in November (70 bp less than in June), while 
that of long-term fixed-income securities issuance appears to have increased by 20 bp 
since June to 2.6% in November (see Chart 10.2).
The banks responding to the latest (October) BLS reported that credit standards for loans 
to non-financial corporations eased in 2018 Q3. A similar easing seems to have been 
shown by overall terms and conditions, particularly the margins on average loans and the 
length of maturities. Banks reported a decrease in the demand for funds by non-financial 
corporations. According to the results of the latest ECB survey on firms’ access to finance 
in the euro area (SAFE), covering the period April to September 2018, Spanish SMEs 
perceive a further improvement in the availability of bank loans. This is the view expressed 
by 21% of them, in net terms, which is 3 pp less than in the previous survey wave (see 
Box 7). In line with the BLS, this source also indicates that loan applications seem to have 
decreased as a result of lower borrowing needs.
Against this background, the volume of new lending to non-financial corporations has 
continued to grow in the last few months, both in the segment of loans below €1 million 
and in that above that threshold. In terms of outstanding balances, the loans extended by 
resident institutions to non-financial corporations continued to contract, the year-on-year 
rate of decline standing at 0.5% in October, below that of the previous months (see 
Chart 10.4). Meanwhile, funds raised by issuance of debt securities, including issues made 
by resident subsidiaries, accelerated, their year-on-year growth rate rising to 8.6% in 
October, compared with 4.3% in June. By contrast, the rate of decline of corporate 
financing through loans received from abroad has quickened in recent months. As a result 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a The last data point in each series is an estimate.
b Cumulative four-quarter data.
c Includes bank lending and off-balance-sheet securitised lending.
d Estimate of interest payments and repayments of principal.
e Valuation based on estimated changes in stock of housing, average floor space and price per square metre.
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of these developments, the total credit to non-financial corporations seems to have 
switched to a slightly positive growth rate in October (0.2% year-on-year), for the first time 
since January.
Meanwhile, continuing its trend over the last few years, the financial position of non-
financial corporations appears to have continued to strengthen in 2018 Q3. Thus it is 
estimated that the debt ratio and, to a lesser degree, the debt burden ratio continued to 
fall in that period, as a result of both GDP growth and the decline in the sector’s liabilities 
(see Chart 14). In accordance with the sample of non-financial corporations reporting to 
the Central Balance Sheet Data Office’s Quarterly Survey (CBQ), which are mainly large 
firms, the expansion of productive activity and the favourable performance of financial 
revenue and costs enabled ordinary profit to grow by 11.1% year-on-year in 2018 Q3.7 
These developments have allowed the return on assets to increase to 4.7%, up 0.2 pp on 
the same period a year earlier. The information from the SAFE also points to an improvement, 
albeit very slight, in the performance of SMEs in recent months. Thus, between April and 
SOURCES: INE, Ministerio de Fomento, Markit, Oficemen and Banco de España.
a Seasonally adjusted series.
b 3-month moving average rates with three time lags, calculated on seasonally adjusted series. Dots depict quarter-on-quarter rates.
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BANCO DE ESPAÑA 42 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 4/2018 QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
September the net proportion of surveyed SMEs which reported an increase in their profits 
was positive, albeit small (2%) and 2 pp below that six months earlier.
Although still limited, the information available for Q4 suggests that the contribution of net 
external demand to quarter-on-quarter GDP growth was zero in this quarter, up 0.2 pp 
from Q3. This development apparently took place against a backdrop of recovery of cross-
border trade in goods and services, both exports and imports, following declines of 1.8% 
and 1.2%, respectively, in the previous quarter. In year-on-year terms, the contribution of 
net external demand to GDP growth appears to continue to be negative (for the sixth 
quarter running), in a setting characterised by the deceleration of the euro area (the main 
destination for Spanish exports), the uncertainty associated with the Brexit negotiations, 
the moderation of world trade growth (affected by the prolongation of protectionist 
3.3  The external sector 
and the balance of 
payments
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Interest-bearing borrowing.
b The last data point in each series is an estimate.
c The GDP data series is seasonally adjusted.
d Gross operating profit (GOP) plus financial revenue (FR).
e Total inflation-adjusted assets less non-interest bearing liabilities.
f Ordinary net profit/net assets.
g Indicators calculated on the basis of annual CBSO data, or quarterly data where no annual data are available. A value of more (less) than 100 denotes higher 
(lower) financial pressure than in the base year.
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tensions) and the continuing pronounced weakness of the currencies of some emerging 
economies (see Chart 15). 
The rise in industrial production and car exports (according to the ANFAC ) in October 
and the improvement in the PMI manufacturing index in November point to a recovery 
in foreign trade in the closing months of the year, following the weakness of the summer 
months. Also in this vein is the pick-up in real exports and imports of goods and services 
reported by large corporations in October, according to information from the tax 
authorities (rise in year-on-year rates to 3% and 1.3%, respectively). The Customs data 
are more out of date, covering only until September. In this month, in deflated terms, the real 
flows of goods exports and imports decreased appreciably (-7.3% and -6% year-on-year, 
respectively), particularly of those items relating to the automotive sector (vehicles and 
intermediate goods used in the manufacture of transport equipment). Trade in goods of 
this kind seems to have been temporarily affected by the entry into force of the new EU 
vehicle emissions regulation, which caused a sharp fall in European car registrations in 
that month and partial shut-downs of some vehicle production lines owing to the 
scarcity of duly certified engines. By geographical area, September saw significant 
decreases in both exports to Spain’s main EU markets (particularly Germany) and sales 
to extra-EU economies (most notable were the sharp falls in those to Turkey, Argentina 
and Brazil, adversely affected by the strength of the euro against the currencies of 
these countries).
Similarly, foreign tourist arrivals rebounded in October (5% year-on-year), contrasting with 
the fall in the summer quarter (-2.2%) due to the progressive normalisation and recovery 
of Spain’s main Mediterranean competitor destinations in the sun and sand segment. This 
month saw a recovery in tourist arrivals from Spain’s main source markets, such as the 
United Kingdom, France and, to a lesser extent, Germany, accompanied by the ongoing 
momentum of its more distant source markets, particularly the United States. In addition, 
the average daily spending and the total spending by tourists gathered pace in October to 
year-on-year rates of 6% and 4.6%, respectively. The outlook is favourable in the view of 
tourism sector entrepreneurs, whose projections are for an improvement in the fourth 
quarter as a whole, basically due to the comparison effect with the low levels recorded in 
the same quarter a year earlier, which coincided with the escalation of political tensions in 
Catalonia. Other one-off factors, such as the scheduling of a world sporting event in 
December, would seem to point to a certain recovery in foreign tourism. 
The Spanish economy’s net lending position decreased in the second and third quarters of 
the year (Box 5). Specifically, on cumulative 12-month data, the balance of payments 
surplus to September decreased to 1.4% of GDP (down from 2.1% for 2017 as a whole). 
This resulted from the striking deterioration of the balance of goods and non-tourism 
services – largely reflecting the increase in the energy bill – and the slight narrowing of the 
tourism surplus. However, the primary and secondary income deficit stabilised and the 
capital account surplus widened. 
From July 2018 to September 2018, unlike almost every quarter since 2015, the financial 
account of the balance of payments, excluding the Banco de España, showed a slight 
debit balance (of approximately €850 million). This was the result of an increase in foreign 
assets held by residents (€25.3 billion) that was lower than the increase in net liabilities 
issued by residents vis-à-vis the rest of the world (€27.6 billion) and the positive net flow 
of transactions associated with financial derivatives (€1.4  billion). Residents mainly 
channelled their purchases from the rest of the world through portfolio investment 
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SOURCES: INE, Departamento de Aduanas, Ministerio de Economía y Empresa and Banco de España.
a QNA data at constant prices. Seasonally adjusted series.
b Series deflated using export (IPRIX) and import (IPRIM) price indices for industrial products.
c 3-month moving average rates with three time lags, calculated on seasonally adjusted series. Dots depict quarter-on-quarter rates.
d Data conform to the sixth edition of the IMF's Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6).
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(€11.8 billion) and, to a lesser degree, through other investment (€7.5 billion) and direct 
investment (€6.1 billion). Net foreign investment in Spain was concentrated essentially in 
portfolio investment (€19.3  billion), mainly long-term debt securities issued by general 
government (€12.9 billion). Other net investment by non-residents was in the form of direct 
investment (€6.1 billion) and, to a lesser degree, other investment (€2.1 billion). 
The debit balance on the financial account, excluding the Banco de España, together with 
the Spanish economy’s net lending position in 2018 Q3, led to a reduction of €5.9 billion in 
the Banco de España’s debit position vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Since the beginning 
of the Eurosystem’s asset purchase programme, this had only happened in certain quarters 
of 2017. Nonetheless, in 12-month cumulated terms, the Banco de España’s financial 
flows still show a debit position (see Chart 16.1).
The Spanish economy’s international investment position (IIP) debit balance decreased by 
€3.5 billion in 2018 Q2 (latest available data). This reduction resulted from the positive 
amount of net financial transactions (€6 billion), which fully offset the negative amount of 
the other flows (-€2.4 billion), essentially due to a higher decline in the value of assets, 
mainly equities, than in that of liabilities. In GDP terms, the Spanish economy’s net debt to 
the rest of the world stood at 82.6% in June, almost 1 pp lower than three months earlier 
(see Chart 16.2). Gross external debt relative to GDP hardly varied and stood at 168.2%, 
which is 6.4 pp less than the peak reached in 2015 Q1.
On QNA information,8 employment grew 0.7% in quarter-on-quarter terms in Q3, 0.1 pp 
less than in Q2. This slowdown was smaller than that observed in terms of the LFS. The 
most recent labour market indicators suggest that employment will remain buoyant in Q4, 
after taking into account the volatility shown by some indicators in October and November 
in the agricultural sector. Social security registrations slowed in those two months in the 
3.4  The labour market
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Four-quarter cumulative quarterly data.
b Sign changed.
c Assets minus liabilities vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
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industry and construction sectors, which was offset by the quickening in the non-market 
services sector. In QNA terms, employment growth is expected to decline slightly in Q4 to 
a rate of somewhat more than 0.6% in quarter-on-quarter terms (see Charts 17.1 and 17.2).
The decline in unemployment registered by the National Public Employment Service (SEPE 
by its Spanish abbreviation) steepened in November, reaching -1.8%, in terms of the 
three-month seasonally adjusted moving quarter-on-quarter rate (see Chart  17.2). 
Consequently, the moderating path of this variable’s decline since early in the year was 
interrupted. The new contracts registered by the SEPE showed higher average growth in 
the period October-November than in Q3. This faster pace of hiring was due to temporary 
contracts whereas permanent contracts slowed. However, permanent contracts remained 
more vigorous than the other contracts, with the result that their share in the total rose to 
10.6%, which was 1.2 pp higher than a year ago.
As regards wages, the collective bargaining agreements registered until November showed 
an increase in wage rates for 2018 of 1.7%, which was around 0.2 pp higher than that 
agreed for 2017, with a high coverage of employees (almost 8.5 million). The agreements 
SOURCES: INE, Ministerio de Trabajo, Migraciones y Seguridad Social, Agencia Tributaria and Banco de España.
a Rates of change calculated on adjusted series. QNA employment measured in equivalent job terms.
b Calculated on seasonally adjusted series at the Banco de España. Dots depict quarter-on-quarter rates.
c On data to November 2018. Excluding indexation clauses.
d Seasonally adjusted series. Last quarter, with data only for October 2018.
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reached in previous years recorded wage rates of 1.6% for 2018, whereas for those entered 
into this year the increase is slightly higher at 2%, which coincides with the recommendation 
of the Employment and Collective Bargaining Agreement. Similarly, the rate of increase of 
average gross compensation at large non-financial corporations published by the tax 
authorities climbed to 0.8% year-on-year in Q3 in terms of the seasonally adjusted series, 
expanding in October, to a rate of 1.2%. On QNA data for Q3, compensation per employee 
in the total economy showed a growth rate of 1.1% year-on-year, up 0.4 pp on the previous 
quarter, as a result of the quickening of compensation in the non-market economy. 
Compensation per employee in the total economy is projected to accelerate further in 2018 
Q4 to 1.3% year-on-year on account of the impact of the increase budgeted in civil servants’ 
compensation for 2018 (see Charts 17.3 and 17.4). Growth in compensation per employee 
in the market economy is expected to stabilise at around 1% year-on-year.
In 2018 Q4 the import deflator is estimated to have slowed, in an environment of lower oil 
prices. Domestic producer prices, proxied by the GDP deflator, are estimated to have 
quickened somewhat in Q4, while continuing to post moderate growth (1.2% year-on-year). 
In this setting of weakened external inflationary pressures and slightly higher domestic 
pressures, year-on-year growth of the private consumption deflator is estimated to have 
slowed marginally (see Chart 18.1).
3.5  Prices
SOURCES: INE, Eurostat and Banco de España.
a Year-on-year rates of change calculated on seasonally adjusted series.
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More recently, the rate of growth of the HICP also declined. In November, its year-on-year 
rate of change was 1.7%, 0.6 pp lower than that observed in October. In turn, the year-on-year 
rate of change of the HICP for the euro area as a whole fell by 0.3 pp to 1.9% in November, 
relative to the previous month. As a result, the inflation differential in Spain compared with 
that of the euro area turned negative (-0.2 pp against 0.1 pp in October).
The deceleration of overall HICP was extensive to all components, with a particularly large 
contribution from the energy component, whose year-on-year growth moderated to 6.4% 
(10.7% in October), given the slowdown in electricity, heating and vehicle fuel prices. Core 
inflation, measured by the year-on-year rate of change of the HICP excluding energy and 
foods, declined to 1.1% in November, 0.1 pp less than in October. The prices of non-energy 
industrial goods and of services decelerated by the same amount.
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THE INCREASE IN TARGET BALANCES IN THE EURO AREA SINCE 2015
Pana Alves, Antonio Millaruelo and Ana del Río 
Published on 5 December 2018
The TARGET2 platform, which is owned by the Eurosystem, processes payments in euro with 
reserves, i.e. central bank money. The cross-border payment transactions channelled through 
this platform give rise to central bank claims and liabilities which, when aggregated and netted, 
produce the so-called TARGET balances. Since 2015, when various extraordinary monetary 
stimulus measures were introduced by the ECB, there has been a marked increase in aggregate 
TARGET balances, to levels above those reached during the sovereign debt crisis which took 
place in the first few years of the current decade. Unlike then, the recent developments do not 
reflect financial stress or general funding problems in euro area economies, as during the 
sovereign debt crisis, but  are instead mainly linked to the execution of the Eurosystem’s asset 
purchase programme (APP).
RESULTS OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS IN 2017 AND IN THE FIRST THREE 
QUARTERS OF 2018
Álvaro Menéndez and Maristela Mulino 
Published on 3 December 2018
Central Balance Sheet Data Office Annual and Quarterly Survey data point to a continuation of 
the recovery in non-financial corporations’ activity, both in 2017 and in the first nine months of 
2018, giving rise to growth in ordinary profit and employment in the majority of sectors and 
firms. As a result of the good corporate earnings performance, rates of return rose in both 
periods and the spread over the cost of borrowing continued to widen. Extraordinary costs and 
revenue had a negative impact on net profit in 2017; however, in the first nine months of 2018 
the impact was positive, resulting in very strong net profit growth in the period. Average debt 
ratios continued to decline in 2017, while in the first three quarters of 2018 the debt-to-asset 
ratio rose slightly and the debt-to-ordinary income ratio was practically unchanged. Lastly, the 
debt burden ratio fell in both periods, driven in particular by the lower cost of borrowing. The 
article includes two boxes analysing the recent economic and financial performance of Spanish 
SMEs and consolidated groups, respectively, on data up to 2017.
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND ITS ROLE AS A GUARANTOR OF 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY
Sonsoles Gallego, Pilar L´Hotellerie-Fallois and Fernando López-Vicente 
Published on 21 November 2018
Given the growing real and financial integration of economies worldwide, there is a need for the 
presence of supranational mechanisms to address crisis situations. The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) is the multilateral institution at the core of the global financial safety net (GFSN). The 
swift development of other elements of this net since the last global financial crisis, such as the 
regional financing arrangements, has made the system sounder but also poses fresh challenges. 
The broad membership of the IMF, the volume of its resources and its accumulated global 
experience in crisis management make the organisation key to shoring up global monetary and 
financial stability. However, the IMF is subject to recurrent discussions about its governance 
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and lending policies, including the size and composition of its resources, and the distribution of 
power within the organisation. The IMF is currently immersed in the Fifteenth General Review of 
Quotas. The backdrop to this negotiation is the risk that, in the absence of a satisfactory 
agreement on the size and distribution of its resources, the IMF’s financial sufficiency and its 
degree of representativeness among its members may be diminished in the coming years. This 
might significantly undermine the stabilising capacity of the GFSN.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NON-BANK FINANCING OF SPANISH FIRMS
Víctor García-Vaquero and Irene Roibás 
Published on 15 November 2018
The banking sector has traditionally played a key role in the financing of Spanish non-financial 
corporations (NFCs), much more substantial than other alternative sources, such as securities 
markets or venture capital. The past crisis evidenced that a high degree of dependence on a 
single source of funding may constitute an element of vulnerability for firms. Against this 
backdrop, in recent years there has been a process of financial disintermediation, with firms 
replacing part of their bank loan financing with the issuance of securities (bonds or equity) in 
official or alternative markets and with equity financing through venture capital entities. 
Specifically, in the period 2009-2017 NFCs raised funds for an average annual amount of 
€50 billion through securities markets, compared with an average annual decline  of €34 billion 
through loans. Also, the recently created crowdfunding platforms have become a new alternative 
channel and although their volumes are marginal for the time being, they could experience 
stronger growth in the next few years, as has occurred in other European countries.
ARGENTINA: ECONOMIC CHALLENGES IN AN ADVERSE INTERNATIONAL SETTING
Xavier Serra, Jacopo Timini, Enrique Martínez Casillas and Julia Estefanía 
Published on 6 November 2018
The Argentine economy is in a complicated transition phase. To correct the major fiscal and 
inflationary imbalances built up in the previous decade, the new government that took office in 
December 2015 opted for a gradual fiscal adjustment, supported by a situation of abundant 
international liquidity. In parallel, the Argentine central bank assumed ambitious inflation-
reducing objectives. However, in 2018 the lack of progress on the inflation front, the tightening 
of international financial conditions and a severe drought placed Argentina under the market’s 
gaze and prevented it from pursuing the financing of this gradual adjustment; accordingly, the 
government decided to apply for IMF financial assistance. The agreement with the Fund, 
approved in June and amended in October 2018, plans for a rapid fiscal and monetary 
adjustment that will provide for a reduction in its twin deficits (fiscal and external alike) and an 
effective decline in inflation, moving the economy onto a stable growth path. The success of the 
programme, to which the Argentine authorities have made a clear commitment, is nonetheless 
subject to internal and external risks, and poses a significant challenge for the country.
REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY. SECOND HALF OF 2018
Published on 6 November 2018
This article reviews, as usual, the recent performance of the main Latin American economies, in 
a setting where the emerging economies have faced a series of adverse shocks. There has been 
a considerable downward revision of the growth forecast for the region in 2018, driven mainly 
by idiosyncratic factors: the severe recession in Argentina and a slower-than-expected recovery 
in Brazil. Furthermore, the risks remain predominantly on the downside. One of these risks – a 
tightening of the pace of monetary policy normalisation in the United States – is analysed in 
more detail in the article.
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THE GROWTH OF THE FINTECH INDUSTRY IN CHINA: A SINGULAR CASE
Sergio Gorjón 
Published on 30 October 2018
In scarcely two decades, the People’s Republic of China has become one of the most prominent 
countries in the FinTech field. This has been the result of a singular set of factors, including most 
notably the structural shortcomings of China’s financial system, the growth of its middle classes 
and their attitude to privacy, a high level of digital connectivity, the volume of e-commerce and 
a series of public policies and enabling regulations. In addition, the emergence of the FinTech 
industry in China is marked by the success of the national technological giants, which have 
recently embarked on an international expansion. The Chinese Government continues to pursue 
ambitious strategic plans which, for the first time, evidence greater concern for a framework of 
robust safeguards to protect customers and ensure financial stability. 
THE OCTOBER 2018 BANK LENDING SURVEY IN SPAIN
Álvaro Menéndez Pujadas 
Published on 23 October 2018
In 2018 Q3, according to the Bank Lending Survey, credit standards for loans to enterprises eased 
somewhat, both in Spain and in the euro area, while the terms and conditions applied to such loans 
also eased. As for lending to households, Spanish banks reported an easing in the credit standards 
and terms and conditions for consumer credit and other lending to households, and no change in 
those for housing loans, while in the euro area banks reported no significant changes in the first of 
these segments and a slight easing in the second. The demand for loans to enterprises fell 
somewhat in Spain and increased in the euro area as a whole, while in the two segments of loans 
to households, loan applications increased in both areas. In Spain, banks’ conditions of access to 
wholesale funding markets deteriorated, while their conditions of access to retail funding markets 
barely changed. In the euro area as a whole, on the other hand, the changes were very small in both 
cases. The ECB’s expanded asset purchase programme continued to contribute, over the six 
month period prior to the survey, to improving the liquidity position and funding conditions of banks 
in both areas and to easing the terms and conditions for loans, while the impact on profitability was 
mildly positive in Spain and negative in the euro area as a whole. Both Spanish and euro area banks 
reported that the ECB’s negative deposit facility rate had led to a reduction in net interest income 
over the previous six months, and a general fall in interest rates and margins on loans, as well as a 
slight increase in the volume of lending.
COMPOSITE INDICATORS OF INFLATIONARY PRESSURES
Luis Julián Álvarez and Isabel Sánchez 
Published on 18 October 2018
This article analyses a broad set of relevant variables for monitoring inflationary pressures in the 
Spanish economy. On the basis of these variables, composite indicators are calculated that 
proxy inflation expectations, the degree of slack in the economy and other inflation pressures, 
domestic and external alike. On the information analysed, the recent period of low inflation in 
the Spanish economy is estimated to have come about in a setting in which domestic factors 
particularly eased, with a notable reduction in inflation expectations. 
DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY (DLT): INTRODUCTION
José Luis Romero Ugarte 
Published on 16 October 2018
Distributed ledger technology is attracting the attention of the financial sector, both owing to its 
use in transactions with crypto-assets and to the proliferation of initiatives which have the 
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potential to increase the efficiency, transparency, speed and resilience of processes underlying 
financial transactions. This article aims to introduce this technology, describing a series of basic 
issues surrounding it and attempting to identify opportunities and intrinsic limitations. 
Additionally, it addresses possible applications in the financial sector and outlines some of the 
main challenges which its use poses for the authorities.
WAGE MODERATION IN SPAIN AND IN THE EURO AREA
Pilar Cuadrado and Federico Tagliati 
Published on 9 October 2018
One of the most visible characteristics of the recent economic recovery is the moderation of 
wage growth in a good number of advanced economies. This article analyses quantitatively the 
contribution of several factors to changes in the wage growth rate in Spain and in the euro area 
during the current upturn. In both cases, the results show that the recent wage moderation is 
attributable to relatively high levels of labour market slack and low inflation expectations. For 
the euro area, another significant factor is low productivity growth, in contrast to other similar 
phases of the economic cycle. The analysis also reveals that, in the most recent period, it is 
important to take into account broader slack indicators than the unemployment rate, given that 
the high proportion of involuntary part-time and discouraged workers are exerting some 
downward pressure on wages. 
RECENT MOVEMENTS IN THE EURO EXCHANGE RATE AND THE IMPACT ON 
INFLATION IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY
Danilo Leiva, Jaime Martínez-Martín and Eva Ortega
Published on 4 October 2018
The effect of the euro exchange rate on inflation has taken on significant importance recently, 
with the application of the ECB’s expansionary monetary policy measures having coincided 
with episodes of euro appreciation, such as that observed between the second half of 2017 and 
early 2018, which tend to exert downward pressure on imported prices. This article analyses the 
factors behind the fluctuations in the euro exchange rate against the dollar during the recent 
period, and finds that this appreciation may have largely been due to the higher relative growth 
of the euro area, compatible with a pick-up in expected euro area inflation. However, the 
subsequent depreciation, since February 2018, might reflect factors related to changes in the 
relative confidence of financial markets to the detriment of the euro, and to the lower relative 
growth of the euro area compared with the United States. Further, it is documented how the 
pass-through of exchange rate movements to overall consumer-price inflation in the Spanish 
economy has increased slightly in recent years, owing mainly to the energy component, while 
core inflation remains much less sensitive to exchange rate changes. 
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
COUNTRIES AND CURRENCIES
In accordance with Community practice, the EU countries are listed using 
the alphabetical order of the country names in the national languages.
BE Belgium EUR (euro)
BG Bulgaria BGN (Bulgarian lev)
CZ Czech Republic CZK (Czech koruna)
DK Denmark DKK (Danish krone)
DE Germany EUR (euro)
EE Estonia EUR (euro)
IE Ireland EUR (euro)
GR Greece EUR (euro)
ES Spain EUR (euro)
FR France EUR (euro)
IT Italy EUR (euro)
HR Croatia HRK (Croatian kuna)
CY Cyprus EUR (euro)
LV Latvia EUR (euro)
LT Lithuania EUR (euro)
LU Luxembourg EUR (euro)
HU Hungary HUF (Hungarian forint)
MT Malta EUR (euro)
NL Netherlands EUR (euro)
AT Austria EUR (euro)
PL Poland PLN (Polish zloty)
PT Portugal EUR (euro)
RO Romania RON (New Romanian leu)
SI Slovenia EUR (euro)
SK Slovakia EUR (euro)
FI Finland EUR (euro)
SE Sweden SEK (Swedish krona)
UK United Kingdom GBP (Pound sterling)
JP Japan JPY (Japanese yen)
US United States USD (US dollar)
ABS Asset-backed securities
APP Asset Purchase Programme
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BE Banco de España
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BLS Bank Lending Survey
BOE Official State Gazette
CBA Central Balance Sheet Data Office Annual Survey
CBQ Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey
CBSO Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCR Central Credit Register
CDSs Credit default swaps
CESR Committee of European Securities Regulators
CNE Spanish National Accounts
CNMV National Securities Market Commission
CPI Consumer Price Index
CSPP Corporate sector purchase programme
DGF Deposit Guarantee Fund
EBA European Banking Authority
ECB European Central Bank
ECOFIN Council of the European Communities (Economic and 
Financial Affairs)
EDP Excessive Deficit Procedure
EFF Spanish Survey of Household Finances
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EONIA Euro overnight index average
EPA Official Spanish Labour Force Survey
ESA 2010 European System of National and Regional Accounts
ESCB European System of Central Banks
ESFS European System of Financial Supervisors
ESM European Stability Mechanism
ESRB European Systemic Risk Board
EU European Union
EURIBOR Euro interbank offered rate
EUROSTAT Statistical Office of the European Communities
FASE Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy
FDI Foreign direct investment
FROB Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector
FSB Financial Stability Board
FSF Financial Stability Forum
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation
GNP Gross national product
GOP Gross operating profit
GVA Gross value added
HICP Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
ICO Official Credit Institute
IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
IGAE National Audit Office
IIP International Investment Position
IMF International Monetary Fund
INE National Statistics Institute
LTROs Longer-term refinancing operations
MFIs Monetary financial institutions
MROs Main refinancing operations
MTBDE Banco de España quarterly macroeconomic model
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NAIRU Non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment
NCBs National central banks
NFCs Non-financial corporations
NiGEM National Institute Global Econometric Model
NPISHs Non-profit institutions serving households
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONP Ordinary net profit
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PER Price/earnings ratio
PMI Purchasing Managers’ Index
PPP Purchasing power parity
QNA Quarterly National Accounts
SAFE ECB Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises
SDRs Special Drawing Rights
SEPA Single Euro Payments Area
SGP Stability and Growth Pact
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SRM Single Resolution Mechanism
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism
TFP Total factor productivity
TLTROs Targeted longer-tem refinancing operations
ULCs Unit labour costs
VAT Value Added Tax
WTO World Trade Organization
CONVENTIONS USED
M1 Notes and coins held by the public + sight deposits.
M2 M1 + deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months + 
deposits with an agreed maturity of up to two years.
M3 M2 + repos + shares in money market funds and money 
market instruments + debt securities issued with an agreed 
maturity of up to two years.
Q1, Q4 Calendar quarters.
H1, H2 Calendar half-years.
bn Billions (109).
m Millions.
bp Basis points.
pp Percentage points.
... Not available.
— Nil, non-existence of the event considered or insignificance 
of changes when expressed as rates of growth.
0.0 Less than half the final digit shown in the series.
